

JPRS 76432

16 September 1980

# West Europe Report

No. 1623



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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## CITRUS GROWERS BLAST GOVERNMENT POLICY

Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 29 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] It has been learned that there is new turmoil at the Turkish Cypriot Vegetable and Fruit Growers Union (CYPFRUVEX) and that Administrative Council Chairman Ahmet Sami has resigned.

CYPFRUVEX plays the most crucial role in the exporting of citrus grown in the TFSC. It is reported that the union suffered marketing loses of around 100 million Turkish lira this year and that a mandatory sum of about 200 million Turkish lira has yet to be paid growers.

According to information gathered, the monetary sum that had to be paid by 1 April 1980 was around 200 million Turkish lira.

As will be recalled, CYPFRUVEX's difficulties had been articulated in the past by a visit to the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Energy led by the Company Administrative Council, which afterward complained about the government's lack of concern on this matter.

As is known, 50,000 persons in the TFSC currently make their living from growing citrus.

In this connection, citrus growers with whom we talked said that there are a number of difficulties in growing and marketing citrus in the TFSC. They said that the foreign exchange obtained by Turkey for its citrus is paid at a multi-tiered exchange rate with an additional incentive premium. They noted, however, that this practice is not being followed here: a situation they vehemently condemned.

The growers want a greater show of government concern on this issue and want the government to stop shelving proposals offered by companies and growers on the citrus industry, which is the country's most important source of foreign exchange.

CSO: 4907

## COMMUNIST LEADERS DIVIDED IN REACTION TO POLISH STRIKE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Aug 80 pt II p 1

[Article by Jens Thomsen]

[Text] "Solidarity. The concept is a mark of honor in the history of the working class. A word that tells with pride of unity and joint action in the fight against encroachments and for improvements. The working class's hard-won rights would not exist today if the simple principles of solidarity were not practiced," the communist organ LAND OG FOLK wrote in an editorial Tuesday [19 August].

Today several communist trade union leaders are treading water to avoid taking a common stand on the Polish workers, whose situation today, ironically enough, is better reported in the despised bourgeois newspapers.

Harry Osborn, member of the DKP [Communist Party of Denmark], chairman of the Association of building trade unions and chairman of Division 25 of the Bricklayers' Union, says straight out: "As a rule we stick to Danish conditions. They will take care of it themselves in Poland."

#### Too Much Politics

Preben Møller Hansen, chairman of the Seamen's Union and excommunicated former member of the DKP central committee, who still considers himself a communist, views the labor conflict in Poland with a good deal of suspicion, and says:

"We have not sent any declaration of solidarity to the Polish workers. We think there is all too much politics in that affair. The moment demands are made for religious freedom and the right to set up new trade unions, it appears that there are other intentions altogether behind this fight. It is thus no longer the workers' fight, but something that is being managed from somewhere."

"Where, then?"

"It could be from a number of places, e.g., the Catholic church. It is correct that it started as a strike, in which they were asking for raises to cover the rising prices of meat. But the sixth demand, which is being made now, has not got much to do with the rising prices of meat. And the shipyard workers in Poland are not among the poorest paid. If we sent declarations of solidarity to all the workers that strike, we should have to have a staff that did nothing else."

#### Hell of a Lot of Problems

The communists' chairman, Jørgen Jensen, knew nothing about Thomas Nielsen's declaration of solidarity with the Polish workers, sent on behalf of the 1.2 million members of the LO [Danish Federation of Trade Unions].

Jørgen Jensen says that he can only support the Polish workers' getting better living conditions, and that obviously they should have a right to organize.

"But it seems to me that this thing has gotten out of proportion; not that I want to explain away or conceal the fact that there are problems in Poland. There are a hell of a lot of problems there, and certainly there are mistakes and misunderstandings on the part of the leadership, too." (See also Jørgen Jensen's comments on the strikes in Poland elsewhere in this issue.)

The communist organ LAND OG FOLK entirely avoids mentioning Jacek Kuron, the leading spokesman for the Polish self defense committee KOR, which is critical of the system, by name. He is only called a "spokesman critical of the system," and it is emphasized that so-called "system-critical groups" are behind most of the information that reaches the western press.

#### Awkward Problem

Under the editorial on "Solidarity As a Mark of Honor," the communist paper also concerns itself with the Polish strike, and concedes--albeit indirectly--that the labor conflict in the Polish Baltic cities is an awkward problem.

It says in part:

"Strikes in Poland, the whole bourgeois press gloats. Indeed, other circles, which otherwise call them socialists and the like, have obviously also joined the chorus. Those who otherwise usually have no time for strikes and for workers' demands in general are suddenly wildly enthusiastic. No real information is to be expected from those quarters."

#### Pussyfooting

Whatever may be lacking in reporting in LAND OG FOLK of actual events during the avalanche of strikes the paper tries to balance out with the Polish communist chairman Edward Gierek's recent TV speech, translated in full from the official Polish news agency PAP.

But even here they pussyfoot. A cautious note to the speech states that "the subheads in Gierek's speech were inserted by LAND OG FOLK." So in any case no position was taken pro or con.

A poll taken among a number of communist trade union chairmen yesterday showed that most of them were "in conference." Was it Poland that was being discussed?

A definition of seasickness runs, "One moment you are afraid you will die, the next you are afraid you will not." Adapted to the present situation among the perplexed DKP bosses, that might go, "One moment they want to express themselves. The next they wish they knew what to say."

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CSO: 3106

## ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE INDICATES MAY COMPROMISE INEFFECTIVE

## International Loan Market Hurt

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Aug 80 p 1

[Article by Lisbeth Knudsen]

[Text] There was a prospect of very serious problems for Denmark on the international loan market when the government concluded an economic compromise last May with three parties in the Folketing. Finance Minister Svend Jakobsen revealed that in his speech presenting the government's finance bill for 1981. The problems were solved temporarily, however, by the compromise in May, the minister says. The importance of Denmark's getting its loan prospects in order is underscored by the fact that Denmark's foreign debt will pass 100 billion kroner in 1981. In domestic state loans alone the finance minister is counting on issuing 45 billion kroner's worth of government paper in 1981.

"Denmark is on an economic reducing diet." That is the finance minister's own simple description of the main impression of his finance bill. But in spite of the reducing diet, the finance bill shows a total deficit of nearly 50 billion kroner, the objectives of the May compromise to improve the balance of payments cannot be met because of a worsened economic situation, and the [wage] agreement situation may completely overturn the economic forecasts.

"The situation surrounding the renegotiation of the wage agreements may easily become difficult. It is clear that we do not need to grant each other substantial wage increases in terms of money, and that it would not be purposeful to do so. It must be hoped that the agreements can be renewed at a level that does not mean pumping out great amounts of money, but that also depends in part on how other things develop," says Finance Minister Svend Jakobsen.

## Consumption Must Not Increase

He rejects the idea that the government should send a direct or indirect warning to the parties in the labor market. "All that the statement

means," the finance minister says, "is that there is no basis for increases in consumption during 1981."

On the basis of the May compromise with the Radicals, the CD [Center Democratic Party], and the Krf [Christian People's Party], the finance minister in his presentation speech expresses optimism with respect to the development of the Danish economy, and he rejects industry's serious concern about export developments. At the same time he states that "for several years it will be necessary to reduce the population's average disposable real income," and he will not rule out new drastic economic measures by spring.

#### Bigger Deficit in Balance of Payments

The compromise in May was to have brought the balance of payments deficit down to 16.3 billion kroner this year and to 12.4 billion kroner in 1981. In spite of that measure it now seems likely that the deficit will still be 18.5 billion kroner this year and 15.5 billion kroner next year. The total deficit in the state budget will rise from 37.8 billion kroner this year to 49.6 billion kroner next year. The state's budget for operations, installations, and loans issued alone is going up by 4 billion kroner. Without the May compromise it would have risen by 8 billion kroner.

The enormous amounts of money pumped out because of the state deficit will be absorbed by domestic state loans. This year 35 billion kroner's worth of state paper will be issued, at face value. In 1981 the figure will presumably be 45 billion kroner, and part of the paper will be converted into new 20-year bonds. In spite of the great increase in the amount of state paper, Svend Jakobsen denies that the state will in this way affect the bond market and the interest level.

#### Finance Minister Appeals

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Aug 80 p 7

[Report by Lisbeth Knudsen]

The government will not count on cooperation in the Folketing from others than its compromise partners for the finance bill for 1981.

That is how sharp the criticism of the finance bill presented by Finance Minister Svend Jakobsen in the Folketing yesterday is. The finance minister accompanied the proposal with a statement that he hoped it might be an invitation to the Liberals and Conservatives to cooperate. He added, however, that in his opinion the demand for economic interventions and further cutbacks in the fall was unreasonable, and stated that the policy that the government has laid out effects, as intended, both the budgets and the private citizen.

"It is necessary to take sweeping and seriously intended measures if the catastrophic economic trend is to be changed," Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, the

Liberal Party's political spokesman, said in a commentary. He adds: "The finance bill that we have now had presented to us reveals that the government has not recognized that, and that its supporting parties lack the courage to demand that the government take the necessary measures."

Palle Simonsen, the Conservative spokesman on financial policy, says: "The proposal reveals in a shocking way how little effect the efforts of the government and its compromise partners have had. The Danish economy cannot continue to stand a deficit of that order of magnitude, and therefore the finance bill can only be a rough draft, which must be greatly revised before its final passage."

Erling Askjær-Jørgensen, of the Progressive Party, says: "When the prime minister states that there is no need for adjustments of the public economy during the rest of 1980 or early in 1981, it is an evidence of how irresponsible the government coalition is, and that it will not manage to change the trend that is leading toward the downfall of the welfare society."

The SF [Socialist People's Party] has not yet taken a stand on the finance bill, but regards it as a bureaucratic proposal that will later have to be greatly revised.

Ib Christensen, the political spokesman of the Single Tax Party, says: "The increase in public expenditures and the big deficit are unacceptable. The Folketing must force the government to change its course by a currency reform, a spending reform, and a land, housing, and tax reform." The Left-Socialist Party calls the proposal "the worst finance bill for wage-earners in recent times."

Only the government's compromise partners have appreciative words for the proposal. They maintain that new measures are not necessary this fall, and the financial spokesman for the Radical Liberal Party, Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen, adds that a reduction of interest rates and new agreements that do not require new political interventions in the fall are a prerequisite for maintaining a good trend in the economy.

#### Budget Cut Plan Still Unclear

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Aug 80 p 16

[Commentary by "lk"]

[Text] The Folketing will be starting the discussion of the government's finance bill without having gotten an explanation of specifically how the compromise parties will find the savings of 912 million kroner, which the four parties still have not agreed upon. From Svend Jakobsen's speech when he presented the bill we only learn that the coinage is now under consideration in various ministries, and that S [Social Democratic Party], R [Radical Liberal Party], CD [Center-Democratic Party], and KRF [Christian

People's Party] have tentatively agreed that the Ministry of the Interior is to be cut 120 million kroner, the Ministry of Education 150 million kroner, the Ministry of Social Affairs 105 million, the Ministry of Labor 120 million, and the Traffic Ministry 150 million kroner. The remaining 375 million kroner will be saved by economies in the other ministries, with smaller amounts allotted to each of them.

The government reveals in the budget pamphlet which the Ministry of Finance is issuing in connection with the finance bill for 1981 that the magical turning point for the unbroken rise in public expenditures over many years will be reached in 1981. The government has set itself the goal of bringing the rise in public expenditures over a number of years to a close. In 1981 and 1982 the government is counting on an increase of between 1 and 2 percent, in 1983 an increase of 0.9 percent, and in 1984 a decrease of 1.3 percent. The increase in municipal expenditures, according to an agreement between the government and the municipalities, will be held within a limit of 2 percent in 1981 and subsequently be reduced to 1 percent in 1982 and zero in 1983.

The total net expenditures under the finance bill for 1981 are 16.4 billion kroner at 1981 prices. Under this year's finance bill 121.5 billion is being spent at 1980 prices. That means a rise of barely 1.5 billion kroner, of which 12.2 billion kroner can be explained by wage and price rises alone. Another 1.3 billion kroner is due to the increasing number of unemployed in 1981 and the consequent increase in unemployment benefits.

In its finance bill the government is earmarking only 110 million kroner for new legislative initiatives in the parliamentary year 1980-1981 and 100 million kroner for a supplementary appropriations reserve.

Besides the cuts amounting to 8 billion kroner from the May political compromise, of which 612 million kroner is not specified, the finance bill contains 1.2 billion in stimulants to the economy in the form of tax cuts. The amount really under discussion for the economy, however, is only 1 billion kroner. The agreement among the compromise parties on adjustments in the property tax amounting to 200 million kroner will not be brought in as expected by extra economies, but will be deducted from the 1.2 billion kroner in economic incentives. It appears from the finance bill:

#### Job Outlook for 1981

*Ugesedden BERINGSKE TIDEND* in Danish 16 Aug 80 p 5

[Text] Rising unemployment, a further cutback in consumption, and higher taxes are the gloomy prospects for 1981. In its finance bill for 1981 the government is assuming 180,000 unemployed, or 10,000 more jobless by next year.

The rise in unemployment will come in spite of a continued rise in the number of wage earners. It is now assumed that there will be 55,000 wage earners in 1981, or 6,000 more than this year. Disbursements for unemployment benefits alone come to 11.4 billion kroner in the 1981 budget.

We can expect a rise of 9.5 percent in consumer prices in 1981 as compared to this year. The government is counting on a 3.5 percent drop in consumption this year which will continue into next year at 0.5 percent. In the budget the government assume unchanged increases in income of 10.6 percent over this year, but that figure may be completely changed by the wage agreement negotiations in the fall. The government is counting on a 2 percent cost of living allotment in the spring of 1981 and another 2 percent in the fall of 1981.

The tax withholding for 1981 is also computed on the basis of income rises of 10.6 percent over 1980. Because of the increase in taxes due to the change in the personal exemption, the graduated scale, and the property tax that was undertaken on the basis of the May compromise, revenues from income tax and property tax will increase by 13.6 percent in 1981 compared to 1980. It is possible that the yield from income tax and property tax will almost reach 100 billion kroner.

According to the finance bill for 1981 it is expected that the MOMS [value added tax] revenue to the state will rise from 36.3 billion kroner this year to 42 billion kroner in 1981.

In a number of specific tax fields, however, the government is counting on a decline or stagnation in revenues. A decline is expected in the revenues from beer, tobacco, chocolate, perfume, and gas taxes, and also registration fees. On the other hand, the government is counting on increases in the revenues from taxes on oil and electricity.

In a revision of the estimates of state revenues from excise taxes and fees, the very sharp drop in automobile sales has a powerful effect. The finance minister is counting on a drop in revenues from registration fees of 1 billion kroner for 1980.

#### New Wage Negotiation Plan

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Aug 80 p 11

[Report by "fd"]

[Text] The new feature in the time-table just agreed upon for the wage negotiations this winter is that the parties do not need to present complete and definitively formulated demands before the start of negotiations. It is enough simply to state what main problems they want to have discussed. The purpose of this is to make the negotiations less dramatic, as neither of the parties is obliged to present a total list of demands.

The other new feature is that the LO (Danish Federation of Trade Unions) and the Danish Employers' Association (DA) will not take up the general demands at the start of the negotiations, but instead the individual trade unions and the corresponding employer organizations themselves can negotiate at the beginning *all* questions to be agreed upon, including wage and hours demands.

Not until the beginning of January 1981 will the top organizations, LO and DA, come into the negotiating picture directly if necessary.

The new time-table is thus the expression of a long-desired decentralization of the negotiations. Arne Lund, the former top director of the DA, was among the chief advocates of decentralizing the negotiations.

In September and the beginning of October LO and DA will decide separately what proposals and recommendations they want to make to their respective member organizations before the beginning of the actual negotiations.

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CSO: 3106

## MEMBERS OF PROGRESSIVE PARTY REVOLT AGAINST GLISTRUP

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Aug 80 p 9

[Article by Chr. Brøndum]

[Text] A sizable group in the Progressive Party's party organization are now in revolt against party leader Mogens Glistrup's refusal thus far to allow the party organization and the executive to have any influence whatever on the party's policy.

The group of Progressives--with the engineer Leif Möller, former inspector general of the party, at its head--has worked out a comprehensive proposal for new party rules. At the same time Leif Möller has come out as a candidate for the post of national chairman of the party, to be elected at the national meeting in September. The present chairman, A. Roland Petersen, has announced that he does not wish to continue.

Leif Möller, who at the same time is a member of the party's rules committee, tells BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that the proposal on rules changes is aimed first and foremost at making the executive more effective and assuring the party organization of a part in the party's development. "Out in the provinces we have often lacked contact with the party's leadership," says Leif Möller.

According to the rules proposal the party executive would be expanded from the present 6 members to a total of 23. In addition to Mogens Glistrup, who is a life member, the executive would have representatives of all counties and large districts, two representatives of the party's Folketing group, one from the Progressive Party youth organization, and the directly elected chairman.

At the same time the executive would have standing rules that could ensure effectiveness and breadth in decisions. According to the proposal the executive would set up a number of standing committees of five or six members, who would have authority to make decisions with the complete executive as an appeals authority.

Leif Möller calls attention to the fact that the proposal also involves making it clear that it is the national meeting that is the highest authority in the party, and not only during the two national meeting days in September. As things stand now, the national meeting has no competence once the executive has been elected. According to the rules proposal it is made clear that the executive is responsible to the national meeting for its actions.

Leif Möller tells BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that party leader Mogens Glistrup is opposed to any kind of rules change, which he regards as a waste of time. Leif Möller emphasizes, however, that the proposal is an expression of the fact that considerable parts of the party want the party organization made more effective.

Besides Leif Möller, Major V.A. Jakobsen, of Aalborg, and A. Tang Sørensen, member of the Folketing, have announced their candidacy for the chairman's post. Tang Sørensen narrowly lost the election at the last national meeting to Roland Petersen, and he considers himself the candidate of the "weak" group.

Leif Möller says he is running with the hope of getting the two wings of the party together.

Mogens Glistrup earlier asked Folketing member Kirsten Jakobsen to seek the post, but she refused, because she is moving to Norway after the next Folketing election. She did not want to be renominated for the Folketing, either.

As far as BERLINGSKE TIDENDE is informed, some elements of the party are working to get the present inspector general, Henrik Warburg, to seek the post. He thinks he can bring together all the party's supporters.

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CSO: 3106

## PROGRESSIVES' FOREIGN POLICY SPOKESMAN BOLTS PARTY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Aug 80 p 9

[Article by Lisbeth Knudsen]

[Text] The latest defector in the Folketing, Jørgen Junior, presumably ensures by his collaboration with V, K, CD, and KRF [Liberal Party, Conservative Party, Center-Democrats, and Christian People's Party] that his former party loses a number of Folketing committee seats. Jørgen Junior has said yes, thanks, to collaboration with the four parties.

The agreement will mean that the four parties' election group and the Progressive Party will draw lots for the last place in all of the Folketing 17-member committees. Formerly the Progressive Party had two seats on each of these committees, but Junior's withdrawal from the party and the drawing of lots may mean that a number of these places are lost and go instead to the CD or the KRF.

Immediately after Jørgen Junior's announcement of his withdrawal from the Progressive Party, the party's Folketing group sent him an invitation to collaborate with it to make sure of his previous committee memberships. The Progressive Party's offer was that he could retain the four committee memberships he had held before. Junior decided, after reading Mogens Glistrup's comments on his departure, to cut all ties with his former party and instead join the four-party election group.

"I have sent the Progressive Party a letter in which I thank them for the invitation to save face, but I do not suffer from the same vanity as the party's campaign leader, and only feel a fear that by a continuation of the connection I might be further infected with the rottenness that he may be right in saying I have been infected with, but that he completely ignores having himself been the source of," Junior writes in a press release.

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CSQ: 3106

## PAPER COMMENTS ON JUNIOR'S QUITTING PROGRESSIVES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Aug 80 p 10

[Editorial: "Jørgen Junior's Farewell"]

[Text] Jørgen Junior's resignation from the Progressive Party comes at a time and with the weight that must be inconvenient in the extreme for the already sorely tried party owner, Mogens Glistrup.

The timing is inconvenient, since it had just been decided that the party, purely as an exception, would seek to win parliamentary influence. But Junior left because he--and he must know the conditions better than anybody else--had no confidence that the altered tactics would produce any change in the previous policy.

But the weight is also inconvenient, for Junior did not break with the party in the same way as some of his predecessors. He did not sit silent for a long time and then leave with a crash. He fought his fight with the party leadership and won to the extent that in the 1979 election, without the support of the party leadership and at the eleventh hour, he was nominated in the Otterup district. And more than that. In a 14-day election campaign he succeeded in gathering around him such a large number of personal votes that he almost reached equality with the Utopian Mogens Voigt, to use Junior's quite apt designation.

Jørgen Junior is not very interesting as a person outside of the Progressive Party. It is easy to get the hero's halo at the moment of rising in arms, when journalists and photographers flock to the press conference. But predecessors in that line can tell him that the rebel's fate is generally sealed, and that oblivion is the fastest-working factor. Until Monday every time there was trouble in the Progressive party it was uncertain whether Junior or Glistrup had the majority behind him. In the coming weeks it will therefore be of interest to see how opinions will be argued and who now accuses whom of what.

Today it can only be said that the previously announced salami tactics have been put into practice. Mogens Glistrup understood more quickly

than anybody else the applause with which BERLINGSKE TIDENDE greeted the new tactics. There are still 18 cuts to be made in the sausage. Then the genuine article will be found where it always should have been found: in the possession of the Utopian, who builds sand castles and air castles, and who wants to perform the trick of making 1,000 proposals blossom in the wilderness.

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CSO: 3106

## CDU/CSU DISAPPOINTMENT OVER STRAUSS CAMPAIGN

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 18 Aug 80 pp 29-30

[Article: "Falling by the Wayside--Growing Disappointment in the CDU/CSU at Franz Josef Strauss' Lax Election Campaign"]

[Text] Having returned from a press conference at which he had once again held forth about the lax government policy in matters of law and order, Alfred Dregger asked an assistant how much time there was actually left until the Bundestag election. Seven and a half weeks, he replied. "Don't tell me!" said the CDU Presidium member in his Bundesthaus [parliamentary building] office; "how can we get the job done then?"

Dregger's concern is justified. After the blow at the Landtag election in North Rhine-Westphalia, the CDU/CSU has still not got back on its feet. Already a number of top officials more or less openly are conceding the 5 October election, for shortly before the start of the hot phase of the election campaign the CDU and CSU do not have a convincing strategy on how to bring down the predominant figure of Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.

The CDU/CSU situation recalls the summer of 1978, when Strauss disciple Juergen Todenhoefer charged in public that Helmut Kohl, the head of his party in the Bundestag in Bonn, apparently thought he could ride to power in a sleeping car.

This time BILD grumbles: "Lambdorff is in China, Schmidt is going to see Honecker, and the opposition is lying in the sun"--the candidate being in southern Spain.

The fact that many CDU and CSU supporters consider Schmidt the better chancellor has definitely demoralized the election workers of the two parties. According to a SPIEGEL poll, as many as 14 percent hold that view. The poll findings confirm the old reservations of Strauss opponents Helmut Kohl and Ernst Albrecht. And pro-Strauss people like Alfred Dregger and Rainer Barzel meanwhile have also caught on to the fact that the CDU and CSU have let themselves be saddled with the wrong candidate for chancellor.

The reckoning has already begun. "I just can't understand," gripes a prominent CSU deputy about the CSU chief, "how a man with 30 years' experience in politics can make so many and such serious mistakes."

What friend and foe in the CDU/CSU are disappointed about most is this: Having set about toppling Schmidt as the only man who could do so with a policy of convincing alternatives and outright confrontation, Strauss has failed to come up with the big blow. He did not even manage to outline an election campaign strategy to the CDU/CSU infantry. Instead there came contradictions from the top.

When shadow foreign minister Walther Leisler Kiep finally thought he was following his chairman's line in advocating the dispatch of the Federal Navy to the Cape of Good Hope in an emergency, CSU headquarters promptly issued word to the contrary, stating that a CDU/CSU government would not dream of employing German warships outside the NATO area.

And the party base is just as much at a loss about which route to take in the matter of government indebtedness. While Strauss rails against the huge federal borrowing, saying that it would be rigorously curtailed by a CDU/CSU government, CDU Secretary General Heiner Geissler in the middle of the vacation period presents a family policy program which would cost additional billions.

CDU headquarters also noted the difficulties in self-portrayal which the candidate was having. First, emulating the chancellor, Strauss presented himself as a statesman virtually without equal. Then he went to the other extreme. Having only just copied Schmidt, he rudely slandered him at the Berlin CDU congress as Moscow's stooge.

Another minus was that Strauss became a refugee from Bonn, thus repeating the mistake predecessor Helmut Kohl had committed in the 1976 election campaign.

At that time, the man from Mainz had been all too fond of escaping the trench warfare in the federal capital and instead had himself applauded enthusiastically out in his Land. Strauss too today prefers to remain in his Bavarian refuge.

Media experts of the CSU Land organization are already complaining about the candidate's reluctance to be seen in Bonn. The less Strauss participates in the political doings of the capital, they say, the less interest there is in the opposition on the part of the press. One official remarks: "The press notices that there is no need for the CDU/CSU. The coalition is providing its own opposition; sometimes Genscher makes trouble in foreign affairs, sometimes Lambsdorff does so in economic policy. We are falling by the wayside."

With even Strauss fighting with one hand tied behind his back, his opponents gathered around Helmut Kohl, Heiner Geissler and Ernst Albrecht find it all

the easier to work to rule. The Kohl statement, "I won't let anyone surpass me as far as support for FJS is concerned," has become a sarcastic slogan among the old rivals.

And so they are already concentrating on 6 October, the day when the blame for the debacle will be distributed, and the discussion about the post-Strauss period has already begun.

Helmut Kohl already counts himself among the winners of this election in any case. No one, in the opinion of this political pro, can deny him the profitable posts of head of the party in the Bundestag and of party chairman. He intends to be the figure of integration around which the defeated crowd will then be able to gather. In this way Kohl would also like to promote his reelection to the post of party chairman in 1983, a prerequisite for being nominated candidate for chancellor a second time.

Schleswig-Holstein Minister-President Gerhard Stoltenberg too is counting on the gratitude of the party members. For didn't this northern light place himself at the head of the Bavarian's election campaign team and even let himself be nominated candidate for vice chancellor when everyone thought the cause of the CDU/CSU had already been lost?

Stoltenberg's handicap is that at the 1983 Landtag election in the northernmost Land, where he once was almost defeated by SPD Land politician Klaus Matthiesen, he presumably will be up against a powerful opponent, for Egon Bahr is considering resigning as SPD federal executive manager after the Bundestag election and to yield to the urging of his Schleswig-Holstein comrades to become the party's top candidate opposing Stoltenberg.

Once Strauss has lost, Lower Saxony Minister-President Ernst Albrecht too believes he will be in the running again. He counts on the vote of the CDU executive, which last May, shortly before Strauss swept through, recommended him as the CDU's top candidate.

Albrecht figures that after a defeat the CDU will not give Gerhard Stoltenberg credit for his sacrifice in joining Strauss and that the man from Kiel will then also be among the losers of this election.

Albrecht intends to promote his candidacy for chancellor with the argument that, contrary to Stoltenberg, he has remained steadfast in his opposition to Strauss and that, moreover, there is no one else in the CDU who can bring the FDP over to the side of the Christian Democrats.

The election campaign managers at CDU headquarters in Bonn in the meantime are deliberating about how to mobilize the last reserves. Thus they are considering sending Marianne Strauss into the breach to fight alongside her husband like Rosalynn Carter.

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**SPD APPREHENSIVE ABOUT FDP GAINS IN PARTY LIST VOTE**

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 18 Aug 80 pp 30-31

[Article: "No More Blinking--Afraid that FDP Canvassing for Second Votes May Cost Them Their Election Victory, the Social Democrats Are Going on the Offensive Against the Liberals"]

[Text] In Thomas-Dehler-Haus in Bonn, the FDP election campaigners are rubbing their hands. "It's working," says one of them, pleased; "at the moment there is nothing more that we need to do."

With a trick tested in 1972--to plead as urgently as possible for the voter's "second vote"--the shrewd Liberals have frightened the Christian and Social Democrats.

As for the SPD, FDP chief Hans-Dietrich Genscher wants to get voters away from it with the argument that they must prevent sole rule by the Social Democrats and an increase in power by the SPD leftwing.

Liberal conservative opponents of Strauss are being courted by Genscher with the advice that, though they can of course stay loyal to the CDU/CSU with their first vote, they should cast their second vote against candidate for chancellor Strauss and for the FDP.

All of them are being asked by the Liberal leader to believe that the FDP faces a bitter end on 5 October unless it is helped across the 5-percent hurdle by many second votes of the electorate.

Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has shown himself unimpressed. At a cabinet meeting last Wednesday he joked: "None of that can induce me to cast my second vote for the FDP." Thereupon Genscher advised him at least to give his first vote in his hometown to the FDP candidate, saying: "In Hamburg you can vote for Mrs Schuchardt, Mr Federal Chancellor."

The SPD election campaign planners do not find the FDP's second-vote campaign quite so funny. They are worried that Genscher's panic-mongering will not fail to have its effect among their supporters. Party Vice

Chairman Hans-Juergen Wischniewski therefore tried to dispel fears about the continuing existence of the FDP, saying: "There can be no question at all of the FDP having to fight for the 5-percent criterion."

This certain knowledge, the SPD leader derives from an 11-page strategy paper of his planning staff. In that analysis the Social Democratic planners reach the conclusion that the FDP is in better shape than it has been for a long time. It has "made good use of the shock of the North Rhine-Westphalia election defeat," the "threat to the FDP by the 'Greens'" has "clearly receded," and the FDP is benefiting from the "decision of the SPD leadership not to reduce the election campaign to a Schmidt-Strauss duel."

All in all, the paper states, "it can already be considered certain" that the FDP will again be represented in the Bundestag.

With the "argument about its allegedly being threatened by the 5-percent limit," the SPD analysts claim, the FDP leadership, however, wants to induce "a fair number of SPD voters to cast their second vote for the FDP." The SPD strategists, therefore, issue the following warning: "The chances of the FDP are good for strengthening itself at the expense of the SPD with the help of second votes by SPD voters."

Also at the expense of the CDU/CSU. The SPD election campaigners think they have found that every fifth potential CDU/CSU voter this time inclines toward abstaining from voting or toward switching parties--because of dislike for candidate Strauss. This could benefit the FDP "considerably."

But even that does not really please the comrades, because an FDP strengthened in this way, with the support of conservative votes, might let itself be seduced "to attempt new orientations in coalition politics."

To make life difficult for the FDP canvassers for second votes, the Social Democrats intend to enlighten their supporters in advertising campaigns, in election speeches and on posters about "the present sound position of the FDP" and particularly about the "actual value of the second vote." An SPD planner states: "In 1972 we only blinked in the face of the FDP's second vote campaign. In 1980, there will be no more blinking."

The CDU too is seeing to enlightenment about the election law. For the first time it has reason to fear that many of its voters will split their vote--in other words, give their first vote to the CDU candidate, but either not cast their second vote at all or cast it for another party.

In Lower Saxony, CDU official Michael Schmehlick, Land chief of the youth of the social committees, is already distributing stickers with the slogan: "Franz Josef Strauss--no thanks. CDU--yes." CDU professor Kurt Biedenkopf is warning his clientele against conducting experiments, saying: "The so-called vote splitting is vote cheating."

In CDU district offices, a poster is ready with a filled-out ballot with crosses on the right and the words "Both votes for the CDU!" CUD federal executive manager Ulf Fink attributes "major importance" to this campaign scheduled for the final weeks of the election campaign.

Like the SPD election campaign planners, he too, however, is worried, because only few voters actually realize the effect of the second vote. According to a poll, only every fourth voter evaluates his second vote correctly.

This is exactly where the hope of Genscher's campaigners lies. They hope for a "semantic misunderstanding" (as the SPD analysis terms it) to the effect that the second vote is a "second option" and therefore not so important. The reason for this "widespread ignorance," deplored in the SPD paper, is the complicated election law.

Because of the bad experience with the system of a pure proportional-representation election which sent up to 17 parties into the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic, the Parliamentary Council agreed in 1949 on a combination of a proportional-representation and a majority election, with the 5-percent clause being added later.

With their first vote, on the left of the ballot, FRG citizens cast a direct vote for half of the 496 Bundestag deputies--not Berliners.

With the second vote, in a blue field on the right of the ballot, the voters vote for a party list. Only the number of second votes, however, determines the majority in the Bundestag which elects the chancellor; only the second votes form the basis for figuring out the distribution of seats.

To the number of seats arrived at in this way, the number of direct seats is added. If, for example, a party obtains 50 direct seats but, according to the number of second votes, is entitled to 100 seats, it dispatches the lacking 50 deputies to the Bundestag from its Land lists.

Hypocritically, Genscher is pleased about the other parties' enlightenment campaign because it at least enables the citizen to understand the possibilities offered him by the election law. Only one person is modestly staying out of the general civic instruction--second-vote bogeyman Strauss with his CSU.

While, according to spokesman Godel Rosenberg, the CSU is planning an information campaign in Bavaria, this campaign does "not exceed the extent of past election campaigns."

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CSO: 3103

## RESTRICTIVE COURSE OF BUNDESBANK CAUSES DEBATE

## Action by Bundesbank

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 25 Aug 80 pp 32-33

[Article: "Seat of the Gods--Loans Remain Expensive--Bundesbank Risks Downturn"]

(Text) For 4 hours the 17 members of the central bank board argued about what the Bundesbank had to do in the present economic situation. The result of the heated discussion can be summed up in fewer than four sentences.

The bank's president, Karl Otto Pöhl announced last Thursday [21 August]: "We continued our course of cautiously letting up on the monetary policy brakes."

Cautious indeed: only the minimum reserves--that is, the funds credit institutes must deposit with the Bundesbank without interest--are being lowered by 10 percent. The savings institutes and banks in the country, the members of the board decided, are to be allowed to increase their liquidity.

What at first looked like a slight relaxation of credit policy restrictions soon turned out to be a bluff. The released reserves of DM 5.5 billion merely replace the money which the Bundesbank is withdrawing from the market at the same time in the security business. Actually hardly any additional funds will flow into the economy.

Inexpensive loans, which alone could give new stimulus to the economy, are not what the Frankfurt economic bankers wanted to present to the industry. The discount and security collateral rates, at 7.5 and 9.5 percent respectively, are remaining at the record level they reached as long as 4 months ago--the highest since the end of the war.

The dilemma of the Bundesbank is obvious. By continuing to keep money tight, the Frankfurt controllers of the economy are increasing the downturn in the economy which has now become apparent. On the other hand, cheap money entails external dangers.

Justifying again a policy of high interest rates last week, Poehl said that the value of the deutsche mark at present was far too low in comparison with other currencies, and the deficit in the German balance of payments much too high because of the higher bills for oil. "We just cannot ignore this," Poehl said.

If in such a situation domestic interests were lowered, big investors the world over with a great deal of capital would cease to be interested in German securities and would take advantage of more attractive investment offers abroad.

If, however, still more capital flows out of the Federal Republic, and the mark is weakened further, our imports will also become more expensive, and money would again go down faster in value.

If, on the other hand, the Germans with favorable interest rates could regain the confidence of international investors, two advantages would be attainable at the same time: the gap in the balance of payments would shrink, with a beneficial effect on our own foreign currency reserves, and a hard mark would result in importing not a rise in prices but stability.

While Poehl's argument apparently makes sense, there are differences of opinion about it also on the board of the central bank.

For some time now, the Federal Republic has been importing relatively little inflation. Since March, import prices have been virtually unchanged. With a capital market rate of interest of around 7.5 percent and a price increase of 5.5 percent, the Federal Republic, moreover, is one of the few countries where investors can still make a profit in real terms.

Finally, deficits in the balance-of-payments can be offset only temporarily by increased import of capital--in other words, through borrowed money. And, sure enough, SPD economic expert Wolfgang Roth has criticized the disadvantage of this method, saying that an "international interest war" might be the consequence. (See adjoining interview.)

It will be difficult for the central bank board to find a way out of this economic policy dilemma, for whereas the Bundesbank law sets the aim of "securing the currency," the bank is obliged "to support the general economic policy of the federal government."

In difficult economic situations these demands cannot be met. And faced with the choice between aim and duty, the board members "on the seat of the gods" (State Secretary for Finance Manfred Lahnstein's term) have not always opted for price stability.

For this reason the central bank in times of high inflation makes money scarce, and thus expensive. But this also means, according to a warning

voiced by the German Institute for Economic Research in Berlin, that Poehl and his experts "are applying the brakes on an economy which is receding in any case."

A majority on the board of the central bank are taking this risk into the bargain. The conflict in aims, says Helmut Schlesinger, the strong man on the board, appealingly, really is "not as great as it sometimes appears."

Moreover, Schlesinger says, the Federal Republic "of course also (needs) a certain dampening of the economy." Then fewer purchases would be made in this country and, as a result, there would be goods left over for additional exports which could reduce the deficit in the balance of payments.

#### Criticism by SPD Experts

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 25 Aug 80 p 33

[Interview with SPD economic expert Wolfgang Roth]

[Text] SPIEGEL: Mr Roth, even after the latest session of its board, the Bundesbank is adhering consistently to its restrictive policy. Is it still on the right track?

Roth: It is time for a change in course. In my opinion, the key to a stabilization of the economy is an expansion of the freedom of movement of the money supply and, above all, a lowering of interest rates.

SPIEGEL: You are afraid that with its hard course the Bundesbank is endangering the economy?

Roth: Yes. The Bundesbank is fossilizing a correct decision reached in the course of last year. When we got a climate of inflation owing to the rise in the price of oil, the Bundesbank did the right and creditable thing in tightening money supply and raising interest rates. Greater rises in prices undoubtedly would have led to greater unemployment. But now the position is different. We have tacked inflation and are observing recessive trends. Now the central bank must demonstrate exactly the same flexibility it showed earlier--in the opposite direction.

SPIEGEL: The Bundesbank thinks that there is a need for more capital to flow into Germany and that interest rates must therefore be attractive.

Roth: This would only be a contribution by the Federal Republic of Germany to the international crisis, for the recession would come into the open all the more strongly. Besides I believe that it will be possible quickly to overcome the temporary weakness of the mark.

SPIEGEL: Of late, the reserves of the Bundesbank have been shrinking, however.

Roth: In the case of short-term speculation, unfortunately precisely the currency reserves are the point of departure. The matter can become even more dangerous since other countries may come to be faced with even more dramatic balance-of-payments problems without having the big reserves the Bundesbank has. When these countries then realize that they have to attack the substance of the matter, an interest war might be the consequence.

SPIEGEL: Are you afraid that then interest rates in the Federal Republic might even go up again?

Roth: The chances are that the peak has been passed. Nor will the Bundesbank be able to stick to the current high discount rate. The attitude of expectation on the part of the banks and particularly investors is quite unequivocal. By putting off the due dropping of interest rates again and again, the Bundesbank only delays the necessary change in climate in industry.

SPIEGEL: What would be the result?

Roth: If one now negligently causes a recession by merely having the stability of the deutsche mark in mind, one also endangers the social peace in the Federal Republic. At the moment--in other words, at the start of a recession--we have more than 800,000 unemployed. Thus, in contrast with 1974, we could soon reach and exceed 1 million.

SPIEGEL: Bundesbank President Karl Otto Poehl assigns priority to price stability.

Roth: Of course any Bundesbank head--particularly one who has previously been in politics or in the government--will always stress that he is particularly stability oriented. My impression is that Mr Poehl at present is out to earn a grade of A+ in stabilization policy. Only I am afraid this will very soon have repercussions on employment.

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CSO: 3103

## RECENT SPLIT WITHIN EKKE ANALYZED

Athens ANDI in Greek 1 Aug 80 pp 24, 25

Article by Stelios Kouloglou

Text Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece (Maoist)  
EKKE member Stelios Kouloglou sent us the following article under title "A Step Backward or a Precondition for a New Start," regarding the recent split which took place at EKKE's "First Conference."

For those who are somewhat connected with EKKE, the recent split was not something entirely unexpected. During the last 2 or 3 years there had been a process of continuing political and organizational "shrinkage" of the party's forces and its kindred "front" organizations. It was the "price" it paid for a political analysis which tried to explain everything with "the conflict of the two superpowers and the particular aggressiveness of social imperialism." It was a "political fine" for a megalomaniacal policy which countered the crisis of the left with the primacy of EKKE which had (or almost had) reconstructed by itself the party of the working class. Moreover, it relegated all others to the "familiar" area of "revisionism" and "opportunism."

A democratic verdict on a function which repelled any opposing view forced it to leave the party and then "decorated" it with the appropriate epithets, as the case might be, and many times transformed it into a police story with the familiar innuendoes.

EKKE, in spite of its daily presence in every struggle, had ceased anyway to be what it was during the last years of fascism and the early period (since the fall of the dictatorship): something new in the area of the Left, a basic point of reference for the fighters who were seeking a truly leftist policy.

Its split in the fall of 1979, with a confrontation with its leading group and the withdrawal of almost 30 percent of its members, left more question marks than solved the problems raised, however incompletely, by those who

left it. In any event, the strengthening of the party "following the purge of opportunist elements" did not materialize.

The solution of the problems was assigned to the first EKKE organisational conference, in early summer, which would have reviewed the party's 10 years since its inception and would have elected a new leadership.

This conference was the first collective organisational body since EKKE's inception and took place a few days ago. It took place, however, in the absence of its leadership, of its majority, and a small number of members who followed it.

#### Fronts of Confrontation

EKKE's split was not--we believe--without meaning. During the ideological struggle which lasted almost 7 months, the majority of the members and cadres developed a comprehensive platform of opposition to the policy and ideology of its leading group [which include]:

- a. A search for a policy based on a concrete analysis of the specific conditions of Greek society, Greek reality and the popular masses in our country, contrasted with its replacement by a formalistic and dogmatic copying of another party's international analysis and its following the Chinese Communist Party.
- b. The creative application of Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao and their further development on the basis of the class struggle as an entirely different logic from that of the unstoppable "citatology," the transformation of the revolutionary theory into a dogma and complex of rules which remain unchanged and in the end turn against the revolutionary movement.
- c. The replacement of a leftist practice, cut off from the masses and a rightist political line in the last few years. EKKE schematically transferred an international analysis by the Chinese Communist Party and considered the bourgeoisie an "unstable" or even allied force in the struggle against the two superpowers, instead of a line directed against the ruling camp of the bourgeoisie and its policies against imperialism and hegemonism.
- d. The search for the causes behind the crisis of the communist movement and the Left in our country and in the world and the effort to overcome the crisis, the fragmentation and split of the communists and the other forces of the Left and of the reconstruction of the working class party against the group of the Central Committee which considers itself as the vanguard and the case of the party closed, reproducing in this way the split and the crisis of the Left.
- e. Finally, the elimination of the assumption about democratic centralism which eliminates democracy and imposes blind discipline, which replaces the democratic participation of members in the formulation of policy by

arbitrary decisions of a small "enlightened" leadership which are de facto correct and must be implemented while at the same time smothering any opposing views.

We searched for an application of democratic centralism, which will base disciplined activity on the widest democratic discussions, will concentrate the views of the masses and of the comrades and will seek the fermentation and joint production of the line with fighters and other leftists.

#### Its Course...

The account presented by the Central Committee to the organization (resolution of the 19th Plenum) found the great majority of comrades in opposition. The majority of the Central Committee instead of trying to understand the differing views and arguments did what is done by anyone who cares only--and is afraid--not to lose his position.

Failing to smother the expression of differing views, they mobilized the machinery of their power at the expense of the organization. It concealed the opposing views whenever possible, then passed into their distortion, then invoked on one side the sentimentalism and used the LAIKOS AGONAS journal to present their views at the expense of their opponents.

When all the "campaigns of persuasion" with the repeated postponements of the conference failed, the majority of the Central Committee used its last weapon: open suppression. Exactly 1 week before the scheduled opening of the conference they decided to postpone it indefinitely. The arguments they used were unprecedented not only for the communist movement but for any democratic party. "The members are confused, have no criteria to judge, and have been affected and become an opportunist wave!!"

This decision by the Central Committee to "place in a cast" the organization and to decide when it will be sufficiently "mature" to "receive freedom" and to call a conference, especially when such a decision is made by a Central Committee which was never elected, a Central Committee which just a month ago bound itself to the commitment that any proposal for a postponement would be decided by the entire organization, a Central Committee which shamelessly declares that if things do not change even 6 months from now the conference will not take place(!), met the opposition of the great majority of EKKE's organizations and comrades.

Since a new postponement of the conference, besides being a violation of the majority's rights by a minority, led EKKE to decay and dissolution, the same members of EKKE had the right and the duty to assume the responsibility for convening it. The city committees in Athens and Salonica and the provincial committees elected an organizing committee and with the participation of more than 70 percent of EKKE's membership moved to implement the decision of the organization.

## The Leading Group and the Mass Movement

But why did the leading group of EKKE choose this attitude? Holding on to the "chair" explains only one side of the problem especially when the chairs of the headquarters may remain in the hands of the "brilliant" generals but without the army, and moreover when prior to the conference no one asks for "heads to roll" but only for a true self-criticism of the present leadership.

In reality we are witnessing once again the transformation of a leadership with revolutionary features into its opposite, when it moves away from the needs and the questions of the masses, develops bureaucratic and arrogant relations toward them, and relies on foreign power centers. The EKKE policy, until the November popular unrest, in spite of its "leftist" deviations, expressed the desires of the movement for an irreconcilable fighting policy of struggle against fascism. The same popular unrest and especially the unprecedented rise of the movement immediately after the political change, create new problems which EKKE's leading group cannot grasp, to join the masses and promote a corresponding policy. Lack of a connection with the masses leads with mathematical precision to the search for another connection, such as the Communist Party of China. EKKE's positions since that time (the slogan "Neither NATO nor Warsaw Pact," the claim that the USSR and the KKE-Exterior are anti-revolutionary) and its contribution to the anti-terrorist struggle against the government, especially on May Day, promoting the construction of factory unions, significant interventions in words illegible are positive but fragmentary.

These cannot offset the vicious circle of promoting a policy which is based on foreign analyses, the inefficiency of its mass movement, an effort by the leading group to gain legitimacy through foreign recognition giving it greater importance than to the movement, and the intensification of imitation. Thus, they created a whole system of anti-Marxist ideas and anti-democratic functions characterized by their cutoff from the mass movement. Any questioning of this is considered subversive and the more it is questioned the more the leading group defends this system of ideas.

Its present condition is nothing but the climax of this course. The fact that its line does not correspond to the movement is blamed on the movement which presumably is imbued with "liquidarist," anti-party ideas. The refusal of the party's majority to accept the views of the leadership is blamed on the comrades who are "opportunist," and the leadership prepares to expell almost the entire organization. To repel those who hold those views in EKKE and who come and have as their point of reference the generation of the Polytechnic School, they raise the rule to "reexamine the significance of the popular uprising which was primarily a student affair without major results." At its zenith, on the other hand, is the imitation and uncritical acceptance of every theory or even tactical shift in the policies of the Chinese Communist Party [KKK].

From this point on, the contributions of the leading group to the bourgeois propaganda and the split of the leftist movement are obvious. It nullifies the process of organized struggle when each fighter asks himself if he should devote his entire self (for us the best years of our lives) with the possible reward of someday seeing his name in some "leftist" newspaper decorated with the epithets of the "unbridled liquidarist," "fractionalist," "Trotskyite," "revisionist," "a slave to bourgeois ideology," "two-faced," "consciously compromised with social imperialism," etc., as happened with the minority members of the EKKE Central Committee, who disagreed with its leading group.

#### EKKE Split in the Context of the Crisis of the Left

The intervention of the Soviets into the internal affairs of KKE and its decay pushed the Greek Communist movement many steps back! The appearance of Marxist-Leninist parties in the middle of the 60's and the beginning of the 1970's did not move the movement forward, in spite of their contributions, neither did they help overcome the crisis as they initially promised. The "exploitation" of the Polytechnic School episodes and the mass movement since 1974 by the leaderships of the Left (with or without quotation marks) movements was another step backward. Yet, something has begun to move forward recently: The EKKE breakup has been added to the realignments, the withdrawals, etc., now taking place in all the forces of the left movement, seeking the "vanguard" and the leadership both in the two revisionist parties as well as in the anti-revisionist organizations.

These developments have resulted from the radicalization of the masses, which takes place under conditions of economic crisis, political aggression by the bourgeoisie, social realignments because of our induction into the European Economic Community EEC, and the developments in the country's national questions and domestic conditions. These developments reveal and underline the inability of the Left to transform the public unhappiness and the radicalization of the masses into an organized mass political campaign to overcome the signs of defeatism and slowdown in the workers' and popular movement, to shape developments, to promote the people's interests, to overcome the parliamentarianism and strike-breaking activities of PASOK-KKE-Exterior.

EKKE's breakup has contributed to these developments, especially when the process of challenging a "leadership" which is cut off from the movement, is not accompanied by its resignation, its complete withdrawal and its return to private life, but by the overthrow of the dominant politico-ideological line and of the very same leadership, the continuation of the organization and struggle.

#### For Some a Step Forward

The First Conference of EKKE is taking place under these conditions with the participation of comrades who had left the party in the past as a

sign of the necessity and possibility for a joint, unifying course, with the participation of communists who cooperate with the members of EKKE in various social sectors, as an example of the course that must be followed to reverse the split and dispersion of the communists and a unifying confluence in the process of building a truly communist organization, the party of the working class. The prevailing opinion at the conference was that EKKE should be mobilized for this purpose.

In this struggle the party does not claim infallability or the role of the exclusive vanguard. EKKE believes that it can contribute with its positive and negative experience which will soon become available to the movement--on the basis of the resolutions of the First Conference. The call for cooperation and unity is addressed to those comrades who left the organization earlier, to the comrades who are still influenced by the group of the Central Committee, to the thousands of unorganized communists, to all communist organizations in our country.

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## SKOP JURISDICTION ANALYZED BY COORDINATION MINISTER

Athens 1 VRADYNI in Greek 8 Aug 80 p 5

Text In his speech to the Social and Economic Policy Council (SKOP) Plenary Meeting, Minister of Coordination Giannis Boutos spoke extensively on the broadening of SKOP's mission and its alignment with the corresponding institutions in the European Community (EEC).

"I chair this advisory body for the first time and my pleasure is even greater because this first time will also be the last time a member of the cabinet will preside in SKOP. As you already know, the government has decided to transfer the chairmanship to a member of the Council and to deprive me of an honorable title.

"The assuming of the chairmanship by a SKOP member inaugurates its independence from the government and the first step to put into effect the independence of the institution, which will align it with the prevailing standards in the corresponding institutions of the European Community.

"Moreover, the appointment to the chairmanship of SKOP of one of its members who comes from the farmers symbolizes the special significance the government attaches to the Greek farmer. As you already know, with the creation of SKOP we, government and society, aim at:

"1. The expression of views on contemporary social and economic problems with the widest social acceptance;

"2. The objective and responsible analysis of contemporary problems on the basis of quantitative data and important evaluations dictated by circumstance;

"3. The unrestricted informing of public opinion by its elected and natural agents, and finally the cooperation with the corresponding institutions of the EEC members.

"The SKOP is designed to make democracy a daily way of life in its relations between the government and the social classes, giving new depth

to its meaning and its implementation domestically, while in the context of a united Europe will broaden our possibilities for equal cooperation with the corresponding institutions of the EEC member-states so that we can profit from their experience and the social progress they achieved.

#### Legal Entity

"I spoke for a first stage for the alignment of the institution with those of EEC because I wished to state at the outset that the government decided to introduce to the Chamber of Deputies a bill to give SKOP the proper legal foundation.

"The bill which will soon be drafted should not be the product of state action, but of the best possible cooperation between the productive classes and the government.

"We are confident that the country's productive classes, which are the agents of dynamic social development, must contribute to the final shape of the institution.

"However, in our opinion the bill must be based on the fundamental principle that SKOP is independent. This independence will be expressed first by the election of its presidium and second by the right of taking the initiative to make recommendations to the government.

"You also received an internal organization plan for the functioning of the Council. Naturally, this is not the final draft, but I hope it will help you in drafting a final organizational plan which is particularly necessary now that the chairmanship is assumed by you.

"I think that with this real and formal legal foundation, which will be completed as soon as possible, SKOP will assume the dimensions it deserves.

#### Supreme Advisory Body

"Your Council as an organ of all the productive classes is the supreme advisory body in its category and for this reason it addresses itself to the premier and to the entire government. This is why it is necessary to put the questions to you through the Ministry of Coordination which is the appropriate government agency for the formulation and implementation of the overall economic policy.

"Your mission, however, is not limited to advice and opinion given in response to government questions. As I told you, the bill will introduce the 'right of initiative to make recommendations.' This is because the government believes the Council can function at the level eloquently defined many years ago, on 19 May 1958, at the inauguration of the corresponding organ of the EEC, the Social and Economic Commission, by its chairman Walter Hallstein who called the members of the commission the 'authoritative

spokesmen' of public opinion in the economic sector. The meaning of this definition is not based only on the quality of expressing the public opinion, but on the characterization of the personalities he called 'spokesmen.' To be an 'authoritative spokesman' for his fellow men one needs to have courage and sensitivity in comprehending the messages of our time. Your Council has already proved during its first stage of operations that the productive classes in our country not only have full comprehension of their responsibilities regarding the problems that the world economic crisis piles up but they also have the courage and the strength to recognize when and in what way dealing with a critical situation can unite us more than divide us."

"We believe"--Boutos concluded--"that your mission will be fulfilled if you enlighten and advise the groups you represent with courage so that instead of confronting each other they will contribute to the advancement of the social and national interest."

"We are the advocates of an Open Society where the antagonism of the social groups for the allocation of resources will be conducted not with fierceness and hostility but through a democratic dialogue and an understanding of each other's needs. We also advocate the idea that those who strive for the best can achieve it through a collective effort which leads to a common denominator; this common approach we expect from SKOP."

Finally, Boutos said that "the government would like to hear your opinion as to whether the transfer of the Lawyers' Fund to the Ministry of Justice is possible and advantageous--and this not only from the narrow and sentimental point of view of the lawyers but from the more general review of the problems and the needs of the institution of social security."

#### Ilias Khronopoulos Assumes Chairmanship

The Council of Social and Economic Policy becomes an independent institution and soon will acquire a legal foundation similar to the corresponding institutions of the ESC member-countries. At yesterday's plenary session in the Senate chamber, Minister of Coordination Giannis Boutos handed the chairmanship to Ilias Khronopoulos, the chairman of the Panhellenic Supreme Confederation of Unions of Agricultural Cooperatives PASEGES.

The government--as revealed by Boutos--is drafting a bill which will soon be sent to the Chamber of Deputies for enactment to give a true legal foundation and institutional dimension to SKOP.

Boutos also said that the government makes every effort to activate the Council to give the productive classes the opportunity to participate more decisively in shaping the country's economic and social policy and to align this organ with its ESC counterpart.

## Special Attention to Greek Farmer

The bill introduces the right of SKOP to make recommendations to the government. As Boutos said, "We advocate the idea that those who strive for the best can achieve it through a collective effort which leads to a common denominator; this common approach we expect from SKOP."

Boutos also underlined that:

The appointment to the chairmanship of a Council member that comes from farming (the chairman of PASEGES) symbolizes the special importance attached by the government to the Greek farmer.

Following his speech Minister of Coordination Giannis Boutos handed the chairmanship to Ilias Khranopoulos, the chairman of PASEGES. The new SKOP chairman thanked Boutos and the government for their positive assistance to the Council and then proceeded with the items on the agenda.

The Council elected as members of the new executive committee Nik. Papageorgiou, president of the Greek General Confederation of Labor (GSEE), Khr. Karakitsos, GSEE secretary general, Kon. Vogiatzis, president of the Athens Industrial Chamber, Nick Anastasakis, president of the General Confederation of Tradesmen and Craftsmen (GSEVE), Laz. Efraimoglou, president of the Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Ioannis Platonis, president of the Athens Commercial Chamber, Dim. Kyriazis, president of the Commercial and Industrial Chamber, Nik. Kolymbas, director general of PASEGES, and Paskh. Papazoglou, director of PASEGES.

## GSEE Left Meeting

The chairman asked the Council to discuss the new Internal Operations Code of the Council. GSEE disagreed with this proposal and left the meeting.

The Council assigned to the executive committee the task of studying the draft for its Internal Operations Code and to report back to the plenary session. Next, E. Giannopoulos, chairman of the Greek Bar Association coordinating committee, spoke and expressed his views on the question posed by the minister of coordination: "Is it proper he said to place the Lawyers' Fund under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice?" He explained the reasons why he asks the Council to give a positive reply. The Council sent this issue for study to the executive committee with the request to report back to the plenary session.

The executive committee is scheduled to meet on 20 August and the plenary session on 26 August.

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## EXPERIMENTAL GOLD PLANT ESTABLISHED IN GREEK NOME

Athens TA NEA in Greek 1 Aug 80 p 7

[Text] Salonta, 11 July--Encouraging signs which have emerged concerning the existence of gold-bearing deposits along the beds of almost all the rivers in Northern Greece are leading to a new phase for the relevant program of the Institute for Geological and Mineral Research (IGME), which began 5 years ago. And these findings have led to a decision to establish an experimental production and processing plant in an area in the nome of Serai, in whose bowels, it is calculated, there are about 10 tons of this noble metal.

While the popular imagination, reinforced by rumors and tales, envisions "rivers of gold" throughout the northern Greece area, the IGME has ordered already the relevant machinery. And it is figured that this plant will go into operation by the end of 1980, in an area near Nigrita, Serai, which was chosen specifically because a deposit of alluvial gold on the order of 2 tons has been located along the stream of Agios of Mandillon.

This plant will have the capacity for processing 80-100 tons of ore per hour, and its establishment will serve the purpose of:

The conducting of experiments on dressing large quantities of ore, in order to check the results of explorations which have been made.

The production of gold concentrate in quantities sufficient to investigate its constituents and its recovery by the amalgamation process or by another method, and

The taking of data for evaluating the possibility of economically mining the deposit.

In the area where this prototype plant for industrial exploitation is going to be established, there is already in operation a small unit for dressing the placer gold. Specifically, here the old and simple method is followed of running the water over a ramp which has riffles, in which

the gold settles because of its weight--along with other substances, of course.

This mixture is sent to the facilities of the IGME for enrichment--that is, for its purification treatment by removal of the other substances.

The large-scale exploration operation for the discovery of gold-bearing deposits in the beds of the rivers in Northern Greece began 5 years ago, in implementation of a special program, and in this interval of time the "front" of the explorations has been extended along the Strymon, the Axios, the Nestos, the Gallikos, and along streams such as the Piliouri in Komotini, Marmara of Kavala, and the Xiropotamos of Xanthi. This program's objective is to explore for placer deposits and to identify primary deposits.

But this program is being "tripped up" by the fact that many areas which are of geological interest are barred to exploration by private big-business capitalists, and the geologists are forced to explore in sections which are only 10-30 percent of the total areas of located deposits.

Specifically, among other things the charge was made some time ago that about 70 percent of the area of Mount Pangaios is owned by two private companies--and this area is considered to be very rich in gold deposits, its gold being known about even since ancient times. It is stated specifically that the gold in this area is primary gold, and it is exceptionally high-grade in its composition.

It is charged further that the Gallikos River as well as areas of Chalkidiki and Kilkis have been barred for many years by the same private companies.

The mining of gold in Greece has its roots in antiquity. The relevant archaeological explorations now put the number of ancient gold mines at 21, of which 17 are in the area of Macedonia and Thraki.

The most important of the old gold-bearing areas of this part of the country are encountered near Mount Pangaios, the Strymon, the Krousia range, the Gallikos River, Angista, the Vermion and Pieria mountains, and Thasos.

In ancient times, the mining of these areas had been limited to the primary deposits, because of a lack of technical means. But there had also been a relatively small amount of gold mining from secondary (placer) deposits at that time along the banks of the rivers. And even today the hunt for gold is still very limited. The most important activities of this nature took place along the Gallikos River; they began in this area in 1951 and ended in 1960, with a total yield of 1,354 kilograms of gold. The same sort of limited mining has been done in Lavrion as well as in other areas of Macedonia, and this has been in conjunction with performing other exploratory operations.

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CSO: 4908

## RECREATIONAL TRAVEL CONSTITUTES TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF INCOME

Athens EXORMISI in Greek 2 Aug 80 p 5

(Article by Stelios Armaridis)

[Text] Beginning 1 January 1981, the departments of the Ministry of Finance (customs houses, tax offices, foreign-exchange services, and so forth) are to be scientifically organized with special machines for the immediate and effective implementation of the provision on tangible evidence of income from "recreation."

According to information received by the EXORMISI which comes from reliable sources, beginning early in the coming year 1981, special "computers" are going to be installed in all the tax offices, customs houses, and foreign-exchange services located in the banks of the country, with the aim of establishing a direct and close communication among the above authorities so that the new provision on evidence of income from "recreation" can be implemented.

More specifically, special file cards will be made up at every customs house in the country, and the names of those who travel abroad will be recorded on these. And thereupon special communications will be sent--by way of the "computers," which will be connected to each other by means of an electronic computer center--and there will also be direct cooperation in this sector among the customs house, tax inspectors and foreign-exchange services at the banks.

It should be emphasized that the persons who will be directly affected by the implementation of the new presumptive-evidence provision will be wage-earners and ordinary workers who engage in recreational travel to foreign countries, whereas business magnates--who henceforth will justify their trips abroad as "business trips"--will not be affected by this.

Meanwhile, beginning on 14 July 1980 the implementation began of the provisions of the new bill which provides for the exemption of citizens from the transfer tax on the first 1.5 million drachmas in the purchase of real estate for the purpose of acquiring a first residence. This

exemption applies only to those purchase agreements which are signed after the above date by married persons, regardless of whether or not they have children. This measure does not apply to unmarried persons.

At the same time, the exemption can also be applicable to divorced or widowed persons (when one of the couple has died), with the proviso that such persons have the care of their children. If they do not have children, the exemption of 1.5 million drachmas does not apply.

The above exemption on the first 1.5 million drachmas is increased by 500,000 drachmas for each child of the family who is under 18 years of age or under 25 years if the child is studying in a school recognized by the State. The exemption proportions are increased by 10 percent if the property is located outside the nomes of Attiki and Salonica--that is, in the nomes of Larisa, Korinthia, and so forth. Below, the relevant scale is indicated by way of illustration (see Table I).

Table I (figures in millions of drachmas)

<u>Purchaser</u>	<u>Amount of exemption</u>	<u>Nomes: Attiki-Salonica</u>	<u>Remaining nomes (Larisa, Khania, etc.): add a percentage of 10%)</u>	<u>Total exemption</u>
1. Married without children	1,500	1,500	1,500 X (10%)	1,650
2. Married with one child	2,000	2,000	2,000 X (10%)	2,200
3. Married with two children	2,500	2,500	2,500 X (10%)	2,750
4. Married with three children	3,000	3,000	3,000 X (10%)	3,300
5. Married with four children	3,500	3,500	3,500 X (10%)	3,700

In what follows, we will cite how much tax will be paid by the taxpayer when the value of the property exceeds the amount on the basis of which he is exempted from the payment of the tax. That is, if a married person with two children purchases property valued at 3 million drachmas, he will pay a tax on 500,000 drachmas, because according to the above-mentioned scale he is exempted up to a sum of 2.5 million

drachmas. At this point, it should be explained that in areas which are served by a fire department the rate of the transfer tax is 11 percent, but when such a fire department does not exist it is 9 percent.

The percentages in question are applied to property values at levels of up to 4 million drachmas. For a value above 4 million drachmas, the rate is increased to 13 percent. That is, if a taxpayer (married without children) purchases property valued at 5 million drachmas, for example, he is exempted from the payment of a tax on the first 1.5 million drachmas, and he will be taxed on the next amount of 2.5 million drachmas ( $4 - 1.5 = 2.5$ ) at a rate of 11 percent (if there is a fire department in the area), while on the remaining amount of 1.5 million drachmas [sic] ( $5 - 4 = 1$ ), he will be taxed at a rate of 13 percent. But let us look more closely at what scale will be in effect in these cases (see Table II).

It is clear, as moreover is seen also in the table (II), that the married person with one child who has purchased a house valued at 5 million drachmas is exempted only on the first 2 million drachmas, whereas he will be taxed on the sum of 3 million drachmas as follows: On the one hand, on 2 million drachmas at a rate of 11 percent, assuming there is a fire department in the area ( $2 \text{ million} \times 11\% = 220,000$ ). On the other hand, on the remaining amount of 1 million drachmas (which is in excess of 4 million drachmas), the tax will be calculated as:  $1 \text{ million} \times 13\% = 130,000$  drachmas. Thus, the total tax which will be paid to the State will be 350,000 drachmas ( $220,000 + 130,000$ ).

A married person without children who is going to purchase property (first residence) valued at 7 million drachmas, for example, is exempted only on the amount up to 1.5 million drachmas, whereas he will be taxed on the remaining sum of 5.5 million drachmas as follows: On the one hand, 2.5 million drachmas (which is the amount  $4 - 1.5 = 2.5$ ) will be taxed at a rate of 11 percent, while the remaining sum of 3 million drachmas (which is the amount  $7 - 4 = 3$ ) will be taxed at a rate of 13 percent. Thus, the total tax which will be paid to the State will come to 665,000 drachmas ( $275,000 + 390,000$ ).

The chief prerequisite for the applicability of the above is that the taxpayer will have to reside at least 2 years in the locality where he will buy the property, although for civil servants this period is only 1 year.

The explanation is given that with regard to the purchase of property in the nomes of Attiki and Salonica which is done within a 5-year period after 14 July 1985, the exemptions apply as long as the purchaser was residing permanently in one of these nomes for 2 years running. That is, the interested party who came today to Athens or Salonica can purchase a house with a tax exemption as of 1985 and afterwards.

Table II (in millions of drachmas)

Value of house	Non- taxed amount	Tax- able amount	Assuming existence of a fire department (11%)	Assuming non- existence of a fire dept. (9%)	The amount 4 million taxed at a rate of (13%)		Total tax which will be paid
					above	4 million taxed at a rate of (13%)	
Married without children	2,000	1,500	500	500X(11%)	-	-	55
Married with one child	3,000	2,000	1,000	-	1,000X(9%)	-	90
Married with two children	3,500	2,500	1,000	1,000X(11%)	-	-	110
Married with three children	4,000	3,000	1,000	-	1,000X(9%)	-	90
Married with one child	5,000	2,000	3,000	2,000X(11%) =220	-	1,000X(13%) =130	350=(220+ +130)
Married without children	7,000	1,500	5,500	2,500X(11%) =275	-	3,000X(13%) =390	665=(275+ +390)

Moreover, following the abolishing of the property tax (11/75), as of 1 January 1981 a supplementary (new and additional) tax will be imposed on incomes deriving from ownership of buildings and building plots, in accordance with the following scale. (Editor's note: Listed in order are the income brackets, the tax rates, the amount of tax based on the scale, the total net income from buildings, and finally the total tax in drachmas).

100,000	-	-	100,000	-
100,000	2	2,000	200,000	2,000
200,000	3	6,000	400,000	8,000
Over the above	4			

#### Evidence on Income From Recreation

Finally, the evidence of income from "recreation" is to be included in the annual presumptive outlay of the taxpayer. For example, if the taxpayer goes to France for a month and spends (for tickets, miscellaneous expenses, and so forth) 100,000 drachmas, then his annual presumptive expenditure will be 400,000 drachmas--that is,  $(100,000 \times 4)$  [sic]. This amount will be added to the sums which are inferred from the other presumptive indications of income, in case the taxpayer has an automobile and house. And the cumulative sum of all these will give the annual presumptive expenditure of the taxpayer.

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## GRADUATE STUDIES LEGISLATION PUBLISHED

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 2 Aug 80 p 7

[Text] Graduate studies leading to master's and doctor's degrees will be organized in Greece within the framework of the Advanced Educational Institutions [AEI] system. The relevant bill, which was made public by the Ministry of Education, provides for the following:

At every school, graduate-study courses will be permitted to be organized for the investigation of scientific subjects in greater depth, the development of scientific research, and the further specialization of graduates from AEI schools. The setting up of such graduate study courses is done by the Ministry of Education following a recommendation by the appropriate university senate and the prior approval of the Supreme Council on Graduate Studies (Article 1).

The graduate studies are differentiated into two levels. The first level is for acquiring a master's degree and the second is for acquiring a doctorate. Furthermore, advanced-education programs can also be organized for the continued training and scientific instruction of AEI graduates (Article 3).

The instruction classes, practical training programs, and scientific research are divided into academic semesters. For the first level, a period of mandatory attendance of at least 3 semesters is stipulated, and for the second level the minimum period is 6 semesters. The maximum period of attendance is 6 and 12 semesters, respectively (Article 4).

The teaching of the courses and the supervision of the scientific research is to be assigned to professors and competent visiting specialist lecturers from Greek and foreign universities, to scientific specialists and lecturers who have had at least 2 years of postgraduate education in AEI schools and 3 years of post-doctoral research work and who have engaged in significant scientific, writing, and research activity, as well as to officials of research centers who have the above qualifications.

The practical training is to be carried out by lecturers and scientific associates of AEI schools and by graduate students (Article 5).

Those accepted to the first level of graduate studies will be graduates of advanced schools who have a graduation score of at least seven. Persons who can be enrolled in the second level, upon a favorable decision by the department involved, are those who have a diploma of the first level of graduate studies or an equivalent degree from abroad. The selection of graduate students for the first level is made on the basis of examinations (Article 6).

Until these graduate studies can be set up and put into operation, but for a period of time not greater than 3 years, the departments of graduate studies which are already in operation will continue to exist (transitional provision, Article 10).

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CSO: 4908

## SECRET TRANSCRIPT OF PCI-LABOR UNION MEETING PUBLISHED

## Transcript of Meeting

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 27 Jul 80 pp 14-18

[Article by Federico Bugno: "Comrade, Go To the Devil!"]

[Text] The PCI [Italian Communist Party], at this point, appears to be going wild: It polemizes against the socialists, against the trade unionists, against itself. It polemizes in the sharpest of tones, as emerges from the secret transcript we publish below. But what is its outlook? Let us try to understand it.

Rome--Exactly what did Lama, Berlinguer, Carniti, and Di Giulio, Benvenuto, and Chiaromonte say to each other during their 5-hour meeting on Tuesday 15 July? Only the publication of the transcript of that meeting between the PCI and the labor unions can put an end to the different versions that have been circulated. We therefore publish herewith "word for word" the transcript of what was said during that 5-hour meeting. The reader will judge whether there was tension, whether there was a clash. (Meanwhile, there is an armistice between the government and the labor unions on the issue of the 0.5 percent wage and salary deduction, an issue that will be debated again very soon in the form of a draft law.)

A preface: The meeting started some 40 minutes late owing to the absence of Berlinguer. The latter arrived at the headquarters of the unitary Federation [reference is to the "Federation of the Confederations," also known as "Federation of the CGIL, CISL and UIL" (see expansions below)], located on Via Sicilia, at 1840 hours, accompanied by Fernando Di Giulio. The first gibe was delivered immediately, by Di Giulio, who has been assigned the role of provoker. He performs it with a will. "We are late," he says, "because we had to defend the trade unions in Parliament, in the debate on the police reform. We, for our part, defend [intended stress is on 'defend'] the trade unions."

timing, because intervention should have taken place before the elections; in substance, because they are a set of punitive measures. Above all, we are opposed to the Fund because it is unconstitutional, because it subverts the nature of the trade unions, because it is in no way tied to planning, and, above all, because it represents a provocation with regard to the PCI. We communists represent 30 percent of the Italians, and we were not even consulted. These are the reasons why we cannot agree to your pact with the government.

[Carniti] I would like to say immediately...

[Berlinguer] (interrupting). Just a moment, please, I would like to have Perna and Di Giulio say something first.

[Perna] (Takes up the issue of unconstitutionality of the Fund and proceeds with a technical discussion of the government's measures, especially regarding the IVA [value-added tax] maneuver).

[Di Giulio] Chiaromonte is right. The Fund is a provocation addressed to the communists; Foschi's proposal to decree only the 0.5 percent wage and salary deduction at this time and to defer to a subsequent bill the details of the ultimate uses of the Fund is moreover irresponsible. We intend to put up a hard fight, without quarter, in Parliament, and to accompany it with a mobilization throughout the country. There is tension in the workplace, and what some are saying to the effect that the PCI is fomenting it is false. We are taking note of it. There is a gigantic protest afoot: against the method and against the substance, because the people were not consulted. We are the party of the workers, and we must fight for the democratization of the trade unions. Our opposition to the decrees is therefore not an attack on the trade unions; it is an aid to the trade unions. We (turning to Lama and Trentin) are in the factories to defend the workers.

[Carniti] I must point out that your motion on economic policy is a confused and contradictory document, and is not devoid, here and there, of authoritarian leanings. When I read, for example, that you seek to change the working hours, I personally feel this is a way for the workers to [portion of text inadvertently omitted here as published] problem is that you communists overestimate the value of the battle over the decrees and underestimate the true battle. I cannot at all understand why the PCI carries on such a strong attack against the decrees, then presents such a weak motion. You attack the Fund and ignore the adverse consequences of credit squeezing to control inflation. We defend the Fund. I can further tell you it is not a provocation. You are making of it a psychodrama. We have said "yes" to the Fund and have opened a consultation among the workers on the uses of the Fund. It is a way whereby the workers can monitor the uses being made of their sacrifices. And as for your comments,

## The Roles and the Cast

### PCI delegation:

Enrico Berlinguer, party secretary

Gerardo Chiaromonte, party head of its economic policy section, and number two in party hierarchy

Edoardo Perna, party head for communist senators

Fernando Di Giulio, party head for communist deputies

### Labor unions delegation:

Luciano Lama, secretary general of the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor], communist;

Pierre Carniti, secretary general of the CISL [ICFTU], Catholic;

Giorgio Benvenuto, secretary general of the UIL [Italian Union of Labor], socialist (Craxi zone of influence);

Agostino Marianetti, deputy secretary general of the CGIL, socialist, close to left wing positions;

Rinaldo Scheda, number two in the communist wing of the CGIL, rival of Lama;

Franco Marini, deputy secretary general of the Cisl, Christian democrat, close to Donat Cattin ("preamble" zone);

Eraldo Crea, member of the CISL secretariat.

[Berlinguer] I thank the trade unions for their having agreed immediately to this meeting with the PCI. The purpose of the meeting? To detail the PCI's position as it emerges from the motion presented in the Chamber of Deputies. I now ask Comrade Chiaromonte to render his report.

[Chiaromonte] The PCI is opposed to the government's measures. Our motion seeks to set the conditions for an extensive debate on economic policy for the medium term. This government is totally incompetent. It has no program; La Malfa's document is itself not even a proposed economic policy, but merely an analysis of the situation. The government's decrees are floating in a vacuum. We are here to assimilate at first hand your views and proposals, but we must say, to start with, that this document was drawn up with the positions and proposals of the trade unions included. With regard to the decrees, the reasons for our "no" are numerous and articulated. We are not underestimating the effort accomplished by the trade unions with the 1 July strike and with the blocking of the attempt to change the automatic wage indexation system. But these facts must not be allowed to obscure reality, namely, that the decrees are a mistake: in

my dear Di Giulio, I cannot agree with them. You underestimate the PCI, you have a low opinion of the PCI when you say it is not fomenting the rebellion in the workplace. You are directly attacking the trade unions...

[Di Giulio] (interrupting). But the FLM [Federation of Metalworkers] is with us...

[Carniti] They are talking without knowing what they are talking about. I listened to Bentivogli thunder against the decree, then discovered he had not even read it. I gave him one of my copies. If your labor leaders are that uninformed, my dear Di Giulio, imagine the workers! But the most dangerous thing is that your opposition is banded together with an attack on the trade unions that comes from the right. Beware how you conduct your opposition! I am not opposing the PCI's right to the opposition; I only ask that it not direct its opposition against things as they seem, but against things as they are.

[Scheda] (shouting). We will see who is who in the workplace! We will see when it comes to a vote!

[Marianetti] I think it is now my turn to say something...

[Berlinguer] (interrupting). Just a moment, I would like to say something. Carniti, you are using insulting words. Psychodrama. Uninformed. Fomentation. Have any of you ever been to the workplace? Are you not aware that the bulwark of democracy is the PCI and that your errors are causing a definitive and irreparable breakdown of the bond between the trade unions and the workers?

[Di Giulio] I have indeed attended the workers' meetings. You are being faulted by them. One worker told me...

[Marianetti] (interrupting). Who? A Montevarchi worker? (Editor's note: Montevarchi is a member of Di Giulio's senatorial group).

[Di Giulio] I will not permit you to offend the workers!

[Marianetti] You are attacking the entire government. The trade unions draw a distinction. In the government, there are also progressive forces, and through our pact with them we have defeated the advocates of devaluation. Never forget that! It must further be said that the trade unions are not looking at these measures one by one; it views the Fund as being part of the same common stakes as family allowances, tax bites,...

[Marini] Excuse me, but I would like to ask a question as though from the most idiotic member of this group. It was suggested to me by Crea: "There are any number of things that are going badly--gasoline prices have been increased, many things have been done wrongly. Why, then, are you making such an issue of the Fund?

[Di Giulio] Because it is a provocation. No one consulted us, not even (turning to Lama and Trentini) a telephone call, regarding it.

[Berlinguer] I want to be frank. The reason is twofold. First, the method: These things cannot be done without a consensus. We are revitalizing the outlook for democratic debate. People had stopped attending the workers' assemblies. Now they are starting to return. Secondly, the Fund is the outgrowth of a policy that we communists were the first to put forward and advocate: the policy of solidarity and austerity among the workers. I, myself, have spoken on it. We favor forms of fund accruals to cement solidarity among the workers. But you can very well understand why we cannot let someone else take hold of one of our political proposals, bring it into being, and then confront us with it as an accomplished fact.

[Benvenuto] I find this discussion very significant, and I seem to understand that the PCI's opposition is not directed against the principle...

[Berlinguer] (interrupting). Between us there must be no equivocation. We are prepared to meet you partway, but our objective is clear: to sweep this government out of office...

[Benvenuto] We understand. But you must also understand that we will not get involved. As regards the Fund, I would like to remind you that during the national solidarity government, measures of far greater import were instituted. Suffice it to recall that the de-indexation of workers' severance pay returned 8,000 billion lire to the coffers of business enterprises, without any control whatever on the part of the workers. On the other hand, there is a control...

[Berlinguer] (another interruption). The two are not comparable. During the national solidarity period, there was perhaps no social control, but there was a political one, represented by us. Today, we cannot agree to be leapfrogged. (Editor's note: He rises and starts pacing the floor, showing obvious signs of annoyance.)

[Benvenuto] And so the PCI finds itself travelling in good company indeed: with the independent unionists, the liberals, the businessmen, with all who defend corporate privileges. Yet the PCI is supposed to be a class party that should be fighting against Poujadist thrusts. As regards the workers, they are opposed because they do not want to pay, they do not want to be solidary. We are against withdrawal of the decree...

[Di Giulio] So, it was you who wanted the decree?!

[Lama and Carniti] (together). Benvenuto is not saying that.

[Lama] Besides, enough of that! We are not battling over one instrumentality, but over worthwhile ends.

[mentor] The Fund must be viewed in a planning perspective. It is a  
meaningful thing...

[Berlinguer] You, of all people! How can you possibly believe the workers  
will accept these things?

(At this point, the meeting is starting to fray out. Berlinguer continues  
raving nervously. Chiaromonte is putting the finishing touches on his  
report. There are comments from Del Piano, Marin and others, but atten-  
tion is slack. Then, Lama takes the floor.)

[Lama] Until a few years ago, I was opposed to exploring forms of accruing  
funds that might test the solidarity of the working class, under control  
of the workers. I have now come round to favoring it. In the final analy-  
sis, any trade union or political party calling itself one of class must  
address this problem. It is a knotty issue, but so was the EUR approach  
a knotty one. Of course, the debate must be joined, there exists a problem  
of instrumentalities...

[Di Giulio] But you should have intervened. You should have said the  
decree was unacceptable. And to think that there were even some Christian  
democratic ministers who opposed it. (Editor's note: Reference is to  
Bragaglia.)

[Lama] If the trade unions did take a "yes" or "no" position, it was  
because there was the danger of creating a deep split among the workers.  
Several organizations from Southern Italy came to us specifically request-  
ing the decree...

[Scheda] That is not true. Only the Southern organizations of the CISL  
wanted the decree...

[Lama] ...and the risk was that of a real split down the line between  
North and South.

[Chiaromonte] (shows the draft communique). It would seem to be that  
there is no possibility of a unitary communique...

[Several voices] No. Absolutely none...

[Chiaromonte] Well, I take it that you will let us know your proposed  
changes to our draft...

[Marin and Benevento] No. If anything, we will send you a draft of our  
own.

(At this point, Chiaromonte reads his draft. Someone intervenes promptly  
challenging him.)

(Capital) there is nothing to change. He will at least keep the PCI's independence intact.

(All rise)

### PCI Policy Reversal

From L'ESPRESSO in Italian 27 Jul 80 pp 16-17

[Article by Lucio Colletti: "What Is Berlinguer Driving At?"]

[Text] 1. A historic cycle in the policy of the PCI [Italian Communist Party] is now coming to its end. Its "historic compromise" strategy--after maturing slowly almost from its emergence as a proposal by the Berlinguer secretariat and finally being forcefully unfurled in the period between 1971 and 1979--is today irreparably in shreds. In the space of a few months, from the moment it decided to throw the last Andreotti government into crisis--slowly at first amid thousands of uncertainties, then at an increasingly accelerated rate--the PCI has reversed its policy from top to bottom.

It seemed for a while as though the breaking up of the "national solidarity" was to be merely a temporary tactical falling back--an expedient to gain time for catching a second wind and organizing the party after its long stall at mid-crossing of the road and its serious June 1979 political failures. Then, in the space of a few weeks--and above all, when the invasion of Afghanistan and the crisis in detente had definitely destroyed all prospects of its entry into the government--the "veer" began to acquire more and more momentum, like a ball rolling freely down a steep incline.

On every front and problem area--from the government to the trade unions, from economic policy to "alliance" policy--the party did a complete 180-degree turnaround of itself. After having been for 3 years soft as butter toward the Christian democratic one-party governments, the PCI is now engaged in a frontal attack on the second Cossiga government, with no punches barred. In violent demagogic terms, the government is being denounced throughout the country as "anteworker" and "antipeople": One could indeed think it is a government of the extreme right rather than a minority Cabinet in which the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] is involved directly and in the first person. The situation is the same on its trade union relations front. Only a few months ago, the PCI Central Committee discussed--admittedly, in tones that were at times heated--the criticisms expressed by Giacomo Amendola with respect to the trade unions' "punitive leninist policy," but showing, nevertheless, through Chiaromonte's introductory statement and concluding remarks, that it was aware of the seriousness and sound basis of the concerns that were weighing on the old leader's mind. Now, instead, and almost like a bolt from the blue, the picture seems radically changed. The decree on the 0.5-percent wage and salary deduction--despite the fact that it is more than compensated by the 30 percent increase in family allowances and the fact that it was conceived as a last resort to avoid bringing into question the automatic wage and salary indexation policy--has suddenly become the key issue in the

setting off of a struggle without quarter, in the workplace and in public. The PCI is leapfrogging leftwards over the trade unions. It is putting Lanza in a difficult position, not to say, indicting him, in full view of his own constituency. It is trying joltingly to hitch the Confederations to its locomotive, disregardful of their "autonomy" and at the risk of throwing into an irreparable crisis the underpinnings of trade union unity.

2. Why all of this? The first thing that comes to mind is that the "veer" undertaken--perhaps going beyond even the intent of some of its leadership group--risks being much more than a temporary "tactical" maneuver. During the last electoral campaign, the harsh frontal attack against the government and against the PSI was at least justified, if only in words, in the name of the old strategy. It was an all-out effort--so they said--to upset the internal balance of the two governing parties: in the PSI, to oust Craxi and replace him with Signorile; in the DC [Christian Democratic Party], to upend the "preamble" majority and crown Andreotti as the party leader. The price being paid appeared to be imposed by the need to save "in extremis" the "historic compromise" strategy.

Today--it is now obvious--the situation leaves no room for an evaluation of that sort. The policy of mobilization and struggle against the government is directed against both the majority parties of the coalition, heedless of the scorched earth it is generating around itself. The PCI is going about its actions without concerning itself in the least over the problems it is creating for its own potential allies. To the so-called lefts of Zec and Andreotti it is by now offering no haven, no possibility of proposing a plausible alternative. And as for the left of Signorile, it was indiscriminately burned in the last-ditch attempt to prevent an agreement or a truce between the government and the trade unions.

Nothing, in short, is being spared. Everything is being thrown into the fire. Any possibility of a policy of alliance has been excluded or radically compromised. Beyond a generic lip service, Botteghe Oscure [familiar name for PCI headquarters, taken from street name in Rome on which it is located, in the same manner as Foggy Bottom, 10 Downing, Wall Street, Champs Elysee, etc] does not hide its increasingly smoldering animosity toward PSI leadership group. And since it is hard to believe that all of this is occurring without being calculated or wanted, it must be concluded that the PCI views the "veer" in progress as something more durable than a temporary "tactical" maneuver.

3. Has a new strategy, then, come into being? By no stretch of the imagination. The "veer" is merely an indication of the policy void into which the PCI has suddenly plunged. And it is not surprising to hear emerging from this void the "call of the wild." On a last-ditch opposition, Berlinguer is staking everything. He is trying to bring down the government and to instigate a crisis between the labor unions and the PSI.

hoping thus to tense the situation to the point where the "communist issue" will suddenly become the central stakes in the game. Not even he knows what he stands to gain from this eventuality. He is fully aware that as things stand today, the access of the PCI to the government is impossible. Yet, in water already up to his neck, he must try, come what may, to keep afloat.

Cossetta, on the other hand, sees all his own cards suddenly being strengthened by this PCI last-ditch stand. Having already hailed with expressions of gratification the end of the old strategy (see his statements to L'ESPRESSO of 20 July), he at long last sees looming the start of a "long-lived new phase," in which the PCI recovers monopoly of the opposition, reduces its distance from the USSR and, at the same time, saves its strength for a more opportune moment: in the knowledge--as he has said--that... "anything can happen." The so-called "right" wing, on the other hand, has been backed into a corner and reduced to virtual silence. This wing, which has a sense of responsibility and democratic maturity, understands clearly the vital importance of a linking up with the PSI. And it intuitively unerringly the snares of sectarial isolation. But it has no room for maneuvering in the direction it would like. The PCI's frontal opposition--since it involves also the PSI, which directly and in the person of its leader participates in the government--blocks its path and reduces it to isolation.

4. I am not rejoicing in the political void in which the PCI now finds itself cast. I am merely commenting it. And, if anything, I am afraid of it. A party without a strategy is surely tempted by the policy of "so much the worse, so much the better." In the current Italian situation, it does not take much imagination to realize what this can mean. After years of summetry only to be left with no political ties, the PCI risks having to engage, from here on out, in nothing but public political action. It will summon its followers to a struggle to the bitter end. And on this wave, even as today it has by now succeeded in suppressing and submerging their views of proletarian democracy, even so tomorrow one cannot exclude the possibility that it will again accomodate "autonomy." The nation is in a tight bind. Autumn threatens to bring inflation, devaluation and recession. In these circumstances and against this backdrop, even the policy the PCI has pursued against terrorism risks ending in frustration. And the question then is whether democracy can "hold out" in Italy. It will be said that the PCI had been compelled to take this road and the responsibility lies with others than the PCI. The advocates of this view are many and they should speak up. For my part, however, I have other views.

5. Conforming and rhetoric (which are, as if to say, the two raw materials with which our country is the most richly endowed) have for years extolled the wisdom of the "historic compromise" policy and the farsightedness of those who had been its architects. Seen today in the light of its decline,

that policy reveals a totally different texture. In it, there was nothing of the grand strategic design. There was none of the intellectual force and of the ethical thrust that actuate true historic "choices" and that --alone-- confer the ability to cut the Gordian knot. Rather, that policy was a system of "expedients," a compendium of "prudential techniques": in the final analysis a device, as complicated as it was illusory, for obtaining all without paying any price. The USSR would not be too unhappy. The United States would feel reassured. The DC's indolence would be exploited. The political inconsistency of the socialists would be taken for granted. Marxism-Leninism would under no conditions be repudiated, would indeed be "enriched" by the grafting on to it of contrary affirmations. The rank and file would feel comforted in the undying validity of its longstanding dreams and would be led painlessly into the corral of Western democracy. In a comparison with this system, Marchais's PCP [French Communist Party] emerges revalued. It carries on a consistent policy. It is closed and dogmatic. It extols the Afghanistan invasion. On the other hand, its policy is predictable. No amateurism, no adventures. The squares in and out of which it moves are well known, and it can be counted on to stop at the right moment. In sum, it is an institution--a factor that contributes, in its own way, to its nation's stability.

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CSO: 3104

**CGIL SECRETARY CALLS FOR MORE DEMOCRACY IN UNION**

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 4 Aug 80 pp 92-93

{interview, entitled "Berlinguer Did Well," with Bruno Trentin by Bruno Manfioletto; Date and Place Not Given}

[Text] In the view of Bruno Trentin, communist and secretary of the CGIL, union democracy must be expanded. And the uproar over the 0.5 percent withholding tax issue warns that all (such) provisions must be discussed with the workers.

The uproar over the 0.5 percent withholding tax decree law highlights the image of an Italian unionism denounced, attacked by the parties and feebly supported. Is this the true face of one of Europe's most seasoned labor organizations? Why are the CGIL, ICFTU and UIL [Italian Union of Labor] confederations beset by so much opposition? PANORAMA has asked Bruno Trentin, communist and secretary of the CGIL, to explain.

Question: In the factories and other places of work, the unions are under fire, censured and actually consigned to the minority.

Answer: That's right. There is protest. There's even disagreement with the union actions.

Question: Why?

Answer: For a deep-rooted reason. The unions don't often get around to involving the mass of workers directly in their discussions with the government on major issues of economic policy. Consequently, the workers are left uninformed on the fundamental motives for their union's actions, they're ignorant of the progressive phases in its dealings with the executive powers. Sometimes they're faced with a fait accompli, in which case they're called upon simply to ratify decisions already arrived at elsewhere. It's not an easy problem to solve. Democracy and participation require tough, laborious processes. The present system isn't functioning, and the workers are justifiably rejecting it. But there's a contingent reason.

Question: What's that?

Answer: The Fund for Solidarity is a measure instituted by decree law. Therefore, this time the workers aren't even summoned to ratify it. Many see this as smacking of government authoritarianism.

Question: But the unions agreed to it.

Answer: No doubt they underestimated the serious pitfalls of this representative provision, which threatens to distort the very image of unionism by turning it overnight into a kind of public institution delegated to take money away from the employed. Furthermore, it wasn't immediately understood that the decree law would preclude any real discussion on its merits.

Question: The unions have lost the workers' consensus. Is it still possible for them to regain it?

Answer: Yes. But we must not only study attentively this proposed Fund for Solidarity and the problems of economic policies but also find the best means of involving the workers in decisions made at the union summit (I don't think the referendum is the most appropriate). That's going to be an enormous job. Democracy is the least spontaneous thing that exists.

Question: The unions have already tried that tack more than once.

Answer: Yes, but often without achieving the hoped-for results. The workers sometimes turn up at crucial meetings either unprepared or actually misinformed.

Question: Why is that?

Answer: I'll give you an example. Once the vast base has been consulted in formulating a claim, the confederations must uphold it. But sometimes there's been no consultation with the rank and file, and what you get are abrupt switches of direction, which confuse them. In the outlying districts, the intermediate cadres should brief the workers in time, run debates, take their objections and reservations into consideration. But they only do these things when particularly important contracts come up for renewal.

Question: This means that today's discontent goes well beyond the controversy over the 0.5 percent withholding tax?

Answer: What you're seeing are demonstrations of self-defense and a repudiation of more or less the whole union strategy. Precisely owing to the limits of democracy in union affairs, we haven't managed in many cases to collect and discuss the workers' protests against various decisions [taken at the union leaders' congress] in EUR [several years ago], such as the revised structure of payments, which was initiated to some extent

without first discussing it frankly with the workers. Now we're keeping a close watch. Their repudiations, their hanging back could be the first indications of a corporative withdrawal that might pose a very serious threat to the unity of the confederations. I'm sure that the PCI, too, will take steps to avert the danger, which could imperil its long-range strategy.

Question: Will the upcoming debate in the factories be forceful enough to stem the tidal wave?

Answer: The workers' dissent could become irremediable only if it crystallizes, if it becomes an overriding principle, or if there should be lacunae in the debates with them.

Question: In the factories, how will you explain the sense of the Fund for Solidarity and what purpose it's meant to serve?

Answer: We'll say that it can be a great opportunity as one method among others of programming the economy in a new way. On condition, however, that aims and objectives are more clearly detailed, that no doubts persist on the constitutional right to extract money from people's pay envelopes, and that the fund won't turn out to be just another do-nothing government bureau. Also, we want this question clarified: must the unions administer the fund?

Question: What do you say?

Answer: My answer is no. That would be a signal mistake, a distortion of the union movement's institutional duties.

Question: Consensus lost, errors, delays. Would you say, then, that Berlinguer was right to attack Lama?

Answer: It wasn't a personal attack on Lama or anyone else, but rather a crucial exchange of views between the PCI and the unions. You must understand that the PCI's opposition to the method used in the matter of the 0.5 percent withholding tax reflected the profound dissatisfaction felt by the workers. On the other hand, the workers have agreed on many other issues.

Question: All the same, their stiff resistance has made it tough for the unity of the labor confederations.

Answer: Our real problem was to preserve a united position in favor of an experiment we think is important, an experiment in which the unions can cooperate with all their weight during the delicate phase in the accumulation process--I mean checking on the financing and distribution of the [fund's] investments. I believe that, on the whole, this project can be confirmed and strengthened.

Question: What, then, does the PCI's criticism of the unions amount to?

Answer: I've never been afraid that the parties, including the PCI, would go back to playing a role in the factories. I'd be more alarmed if the old collateral relation between the political forces and the unions should somehow crop up again. That's why in my opinion, it's most significant that the communists want to meet with the three unions at the same table, instead of one by one.

Question: Something is changing in rapport between the unions and the parties.

Answer: For some time now, there's been a crisis in an old division of their functions. Now the parties are moving in on specific issues in the union movement, and we're doing the same, although our responsibilities are different. This doesn't shock me in the least. The danger, rather, is going to have an exchange of views with the government as if it simply concerned a contract--that is, a comparison of views on a matter which can never be resolved at the top, it must also involve Parliament and the parties.

Question: The communist Fernando Di Giulio has told PANORAMA: "The real problem of a guarantee for the workers depends on whether or not the government is trustworthy. And this government is not."

Answer: No, our present government is not trustworthy. But what can we do? Disarm the union movement and wait for a government that will win the confidence of the united confederations? That's not possible, and one reason is that there are naturally differences of opinions within the unions about which government is the best one.

Question: Won't your opposition change if all the parties of the left are out of the government?

Answer: We can't go back to the past arrangement whereby unionism is open to the social compact whenever the left is in the government but anchored to a prejudiced opposition whenever the left is out of it, altogether or in part. We refused to yield to such an idea, even when all the parties of the left were in the majority. If this government isn't very trustworthy, then we must combine the fight for the fund with our battle for a new direction in the government's economic policy. I mean, the government must be put to the test, first, on the merits of its political choices, and secondly, on how those choices can be realized. The clash could be a bitter one; but a preconceived lack of faith in a government without any verification of its real actions isn't a practical attitude for the unions to take.

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CSO: 3104

## NEW COMMUNIST PUBLICATIONS TO APPEAR

Milan PANORAMA in Italia: Aug 80 pp 76-77

[Article by Elisabetta Rasy: "So Long, Old Marx"]

[Text] This winter Communist intellectuals will launch two new periodicals, both with ideological and political significance. Today, the traditional principles of Marxism are being questioned, and many attempts are being made to find new solutions. Perhaps too many.

With denials and confirmations dragging on for over a year, the whole matter took on aspects of a detective story. Now, however, everything is settled. Beginning in the winter of 1981, PCI intellectuals will give battle not only to noncommunists but also to each other--and not in the columns of the orthodox party organs ('UNITA', the weekly RINASCITA and the bimonthly CRITICA MARXISTA) but in two new magazines to be issued by noncommunist publishers, Einaudi and the Neapolitan Guida.

The first, entitled LABORATORIO POLITICO, will be a bimonthly with a cultural orientation but also concerned with subjects of more or less immediate interest. Its editorial board will be headed by Mario Tronti, philosopher and political observer for the working class. But along with militant communists like Giacomo Marramao, Alberto Asor Rosa, Rita Di Leo and Loris Acconero, the staff will include scholars who are not only outsiders but often in opposition to the PCI, such as the sociologist Carlo Donolo.

The magazine published by Guida, with even more ambitious aims, will hit the newsstands a few months later. Appearing less often, probably every 3 or 4 months, it will treat topics far removed from the current political scene. One of its first issues, for example, will be entirely dedicated to the interrelation between theology and philosophy. Directed by the southern Italian philosopher Biagio De Giovanni, with the collaboration of Massimo Cacciari and Remo Bodei among others, the review proposed to revivify the discussion on theoretical research.

But after a period of time marked by individualism in political attitudes and the breakup of the old, entrenched groups, why have the foremost PCI intellectuals chosen openly to turn away from established communist publishing procedure and, what's more, with two distinctly different ventures?

"Today, the latent crisis which has pitted intellectuals against the PCI for some time now, is exploding," complain the staff members of CRITICA MARXISTA, hitherto the most authoritative party organ of theoretical research. "All the politicotheoretical categories that prevailed until now are outdated. Political activism has destroyed them."

Not only that. According to the CRITICA MARXISTA's editorial staff, the present situation is so fragmented that "it is no longer possible to speak of a hard core of intellectuals within the party. This is partially true because, with rare exceptions, no one in the PCI feels any necessity whatever for a long-term policy."

The decision to abandon communist tradition in publishing the two new reviews confirms what the CRITICA MARXISTA staff contends. It is not by chance that, in 1979 two other magazine projects suggested by the same intellectuals who are now under the aegis of Einaudi and Guida, were rejected by the party's cultural committee, even though Aldo Tortorella, the committee chairman, nurtures a somewhat prudent sympathy for the new leaders of social thought--or so those involved give us to understand.

The truth is that the two new projects provided a rallying point for the more advanced intellectuals by syncretizing their malaise and insuffrance for the historical categories of Marxist thought. Meanwhile, the PCI was making repeated efforts to win back its more restless intellectuals by bringing up themes previously deemed heretical (for example, an insert in FINASCITA on Nietzsche's philosophy, which aroused considerable controversy in the summer of 1978). Two years ago, the party took its most decisive move in this direction when CONTEMPORANEO, the cultural supplement of RINASCITA, dedicated an issue to the relations between intellectuals and politics in the wake of 20 June [1978].

Asked to participate in this issue were contributors completely at variance with communist culture, including the conservative Catholic philosopher Augusto Del Noce, the socialist Norberto Bobbio, the radical Gianni Vattimo, and the theologian Italo Mancini. In the same issue, Alberto Asor Rosa urged readers to give thought to the traditional work categories, with criticisms of the austerity concept then in vogue, while Massimo Cacciari suggested that they discard the old ideological jargon, by now sclerotic, for the new, more rigorous and highly specialized terminology.

But what has happened since then to draw the new wave of communist intellectuals away from their isolated, provocative, individual initiatives into group challenge? What caused them to write off as no longer valid

certain fundamental concepts of traditional Marxism, such as the notion of imperialism in foreign policy and class struggle (or even of class itself) in internal affairs?

Giacomo Marramao, 37, formerly an exponent of the student movement, member of the PCI since 1975, and today one of the top philosophers of the new generation, entertains no doubts: communist cultural tradition failed to hold up when the PCI chiefs had to grapple with the problems of government--and, he pointed out with feeling, "being heckled constantly by challenges hurled at them from the radical-socialist camp!"

It was at this point that the old groups, which had clung together within the party, but not without their difficulties, began to splinter. Old alignments fell apart, Cacciari, Tronti and Asor Rosa opposed the Bari-Naples school of Giuseppe Vacca and De Giovanni, plus the pure Tuscan philosophers Badaloni and Cesare Luporini.

From this dispersion, however, a conviction shared by many is now emerging: the workers' movement must accept a conflicting view of democracy, in which the old divisions--proletariat, bourgeoisie and capitalism--are vanishing from the new configurations of society (Asor Rosa was one of the first to explain in lucid terms how class differences no longer play a significant role today, with working- and middle-class students rubbing shoulders).

What, in short, is moving definitively into crisis is the culture of the opposition, which dominated communist thought until the early 70s (the last of the warrior paladins to defend it are outmoded political thinkers, such as, Badaloni, Valentino Gerratana and Gabriele Giannantoni).

The dissent among these new intellectuals, who flock to the Goethe Institute in Rome for the seminar on Max Weber ("Today we are reassessing the primacy of internal policy," they explain, "and Weber is a pillar of bourgeois, not Marxist, thought") but pass up the conference on Bucharin ("Historical rehabilitation can no longer be taken seriously") is not only directed against the party stalwarts, "caught," they maintain, "in an old-fashioned spider web"; they also differ among themselves.

In what sounds like medieval terminology, someone has divided them into monists and pluralists. The former, among them Vacca and Tronti, still believe that a political synthesis is feasible; the latter, with Cacciari at their head, and counting younger political thinkers like Marramao and Leonardo Paggi, assert that society is irremediably fragmented and diversified; talk of proletarian hegemony no longer makes any sense.

But is this truly heresy? "Certainly not," Paggi responds without a moment's hesitation. "First of all, it is an attempt to modernize our culture, and it has already shown definite results. It is a move to put relations between communist intellectuals and the party on a laic, less emotional basis. With the natural consequence that nowadays it's harder to determine what it means to promote culture and be militants at the same time."

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CSO: 3104

## SYMPATHIZERS SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 26 Jul 80 pp 10-12

Article by Coen van Harten: "Sympathizer Network Support for International Terrorism" /

Text The Netherlands "sympathizer network" plays an important role in world revolution, as terrorist organizations pursue it. A colorful variety of organizations with widely divergent goals, from feminism to the nation liberation struggle, act as accomplices for international terrorism. The arrest in North Ireland of the Dutch journalist, Els van Hout, emphasizes the importance of the way in which solidarity is demonstrated in the Netherlands.

"Women in North Ireland are humiliated not only in prison, but also in the street and at the police station and they are the victims of the hatred of women by the British soldiers and the police. Women are intimidated on the street. If they are arrested they are threatened with rape, forced to disrobe or take a shower where a number of soldiers often appear to laugh at them and make humiliating remarks." Els (Elizabeth) van Hout wrote those lines in May 1980 in NIEUWE LINIE. The charge which she has made against the North Ireland government rather agrees with her "J'accuse" in the former Jesuit newspaper: "Irish justice makes criminals of politically active women."

Last week, 30-year-old Els van Hout was arrested at the Belfast station on the basis of The Law on Terrorist Organizations. She was suspected of being in contact with the IRA. The British Minister of state for Northern Ireland, Humphrey Atkins, personally consented to keeping her imprisoned the

full 7 days the law allows. She was tried at Castlereagh. Two years ago Amnesty International accused the police there of mistreating arrested persons. Van Hout's North Irish lawyer, H. Patrick Finicane, disputes not only the legality of her arrest (as well as the order of expulsion), but also says that "a certain type of physical violence" was practiced on her. In addition "insulting insinuations" allegedly have been made. Besides Finicane, Van Hout is also obtaining legal assistance from the Dutch lawyer, doctor of laws, Sietske van der Land, of the lawyer cooperative in Amsterdam.

It was not the first time that Els van Hout visited North Ireland. The time before last she participated in a "tribunal" which accused the British authorities of mistreating women at Armagh prison. She not only wrote a report on it in NIEUWE LINIE but also discussed it on VPRO Liberal Protestant Broadcasting Association radio. Els van Hout is a typical representative of the school which is not concerned about Anglo-Saxon journalistic traditions, which hold that a journalist must always protect his status as a nonparticipant. A journalist is an independent observer who may not play a role, in any way, in the processes which he observes. Els van Hout is not that type. She is not even a journalist who, although too much involved, is concerned about her subject. In the first case, she was the subject and she obtained a press card from NIEUWE LINIE on the grounds of that involvement.

The NVJ Netherlands Association of Journalists hastened to protest her arrest. The NVJ claims no specific charges were made against her and that, moreover, she had a press card and a letter of introduction (a safe-conduct?) from NIEUWE LINIE. She would again write an article for that newspaper on the situation of women in North Ireland.

Els van Hout is not only a representative of a journalistic "school," she answers in every respect the description of those who belong to the "sympathizer network." Organizations such as the PLO Palestine Liberation Organization, RAF Red Army Faction, The Basque Liberation Movement, ETA Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group could not operate without sympathizers. Protest demonstrations are very important, but solidarity can also assume more active forms, as in the case of Els van Hout.

The "highly trained professionals," who executed the British Ambassador Sir Richard Sykes and his valet in The Hague in March 1979, could not have possibly struck so effectively without the support of Netherlands sympathizers. The Netherlands

police and the BVD *[Internal Security Service]* shared this conclusion of the British Police and Secret Service. Considerable time passed before the IRA claimed responsibility for Bykes' murder in a statement issued in Dublin. It was in February 1980, almost a year after the execution of the death sentence which the IRA had pronounced on the British ambassador. The perpetrators were then already far beyond the reach of the criminal investigation services. There is not the slightest doubt in political circles that their escape routes were protected by Dutch sympathizers. Because of the lack of specific antiterrorist legislation, the Netherlands seems to be an ideal medium for spawning semi-terrorist sympathizer organizations, operating in the shadows. The sympathizers are thoroughly aware of that. Cooperation with terrorist organizations is not punishable in the Netherlands. That is why the woman teacher, Ciska Eeken, defied the Public Prosecutor's Office about legally prosecuting her on the basis of statements which were made by the Dutch woman, Ludwina Jensen, then arrested in Israel. One and another was fully aware that such a prosecution is completely impossible legally. Ciska and Adriaan Eeken, leaders of the Marxist-Leninist Red Resistance Front, had no scruples about declaring publicly 2 years later that they had been trained in a Palestinian Liberation Front camp in Aden, South Yemen. Meanwhile Ciska Eeken had declared that MOSSAD *[Israeli Secret Service]* "had made solidarity with the Palestinian resistance a crime." The stylistic agreement with Els van Hout's statements is striking: "Irish justice makes criminals of politically active women."

MOSSAD got from Ludwina Jensen, who meanwhile had been released, not only the name of Ciska Eeken, but also that of Els van Hout. According to Ludwina Jensen, she also had terrorist training in South Yemen. There are still other parallels. After Ludwina Jensen had mentioned Ciska Eeken's name she resigned from the Palestinian Committee, in order not to compromise that organization. Two years ago the Red Resistance Front (of the ICA) not only disclaimed having anything to do with an abortive attempt at the Amsterdam office of the German insurance company, Allianz, but the Ireland Committee also denied any involvement.

The attempt was planned by Els van Hout, the Irishman, Eugene G. and the sister of Dutch RAP terrorist, Ronald Augustin, Monique. On Liberation Day 1978, the trio were arrested, when they were on the way to the office at Keizersgracht. They were on bicycles and had a shopping bag with two Molotov cocktails and a letter to the ANP *[General Netherlands Press Agency]*:

"While the Dutch people commemorate the victims of the old fascism, we commemorate in this way not only them, but all fighters who have fallen in the anti-imperialist struggle, especially our comrades who were murdered by the new German fascism, namely Siegfried Haesner on 4 May 1975 and Ulrike Meinhof on 9 May 1976." According to the statement of the revolutionary core, Els van Hout was released and vanished during the trial. She was sentenced by default to 1 year in prison.

Although Els van Hout played a prominent role in the Ireland Committee, this organization kept its distance from the attempt. Els van Hout did not make a single remark about her arrest, except the cryptic announcement: "What has happened here absolutely involves no other organization." The strength of the sympathizers' network is concealed, among other things, by the multiplicity of organizations, which apparently are pursuing other goals. In order to make it difficult to establish connections, these clubs are regularly disbanded and founded again. For example, the Ireland Committee was discontinued several years ago, when it became all too clear how this organization was associated with Red Youth. This was an organization which also was dissolved, but several of its leaders again appeared later in Red Assistance. The Ireland Committee, at that time, was especially active in Breda, the home of Ludwina Jensen. When this terrorist revealed in Israel that the group was a pool of aspiring terrorists, the Ireland Committee was disbanded. "Another" Ireland Committee was set up. Nijmegen and Amsterdam are now especially centers of operation. The BVD watched the activities in Breda closely, but legally there were no opportunities to intervene. They did not exist even in 1972 when the IRA member, Jim McCann, was reported in this city, mostly in the company of activists from the Ireland Committee. McCann, so it appeared later, prepared from Breda a bomb attack on the NATO Forces Headquarters in Moenchengladbach (September 1972). But then McCann had already disappeared from the Netherlands again. According to the British Secret Service, the IRA activities in Germany were organized from the "safe" Netherlands. Facilities were provided by Dutchmen who had close ties with West German militants. Meanwhile the coordination center moved from Breda and Nijmegen to Amsterdam.

According to the British Secret Service, the acting IRA chief of staff at that time, David O'Connell was helped by several Dutchmen during his stay in Amsterdam, where he organized a large arms deal. O'Connell then escaped arrest in the nick of

time. In 1977, it was again demonstrated how comfortable Amsterdam is. The IRA member, Patrick Gallagher managed to hide there unobserved for over a year. He entered the Netherlands with a false passport and managed to get a nice job in municipal sanitation. Eleven organizations protested about his expulsion. It is not only the Ireland Committee which harbors warm feelings of solidarity with the IRA. Certainly that organization displays that solidarity the most conspicuously. Thus six members of the Ireland Committee occupied British Airways' office in 1978. Last week 30 women protested to the British consul about the arrest of Els van Hout, who declared in North Ireland that she was a member of the organization, Women against Imperialism, a North Irish organization which has a counterpart in the Women's Center in Amsterdam. She declared the goal of her trip was to set up a women's center in Belfast.

Els van Hout's feminist ideas are definitely Marxist-Leninist oriented. It is not so much the struggle of the North Irish women which interests her. That struggle makes the North Irish women definitely aware of their position, so Van Hout explained in NIEUWE LINIE. "Because these women often have become active because of their emotional involvement with their region, instead of standing up for their own interests as women, these activities seem to be unimportant from the feminist point of view." Still Van Hout sees opportunities for socialism. An organization such as the Socialist Women's Group, closely connected with Women against Imperialism can give ideological guidance to awakening women's consciousness in North Ireland. These are organizations which again were supported by the Ireland Committee. In her article in NIEUWE LINIE, Els van Hout mentions the transfer number of this committee. The Ireland Committee is not for a free, undivided Ireland, but for a Marxist-Leninist Ireland. And that goal fits in perfectly with that of other militant organizations which approve of violence. For such groups, the Netherlands has become the most ideal attack base in Europe.

8490  
CSO: 3105

## ARMED FORCES DELEGATION MAKES FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO PRC

## Delegation Head Describes Visit

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 6 Aug 80 p 11

[Text] The Chinese authorities have reaffirmed once more, in Peking, the political stability of Macao and a guarantee that local interests will never be jeopardized.

These statements were made to General Conceicao e Silva who headed a Portuguese military delegation that visited the People's Republic of China.



General Conceicao e Silva, head of the Portuguese military delegation that visited the People's Republic of China recently. "It has been practically agreed that, next year, a delegation of senior officers of the People's Liberation Army will visit Portugal."

During the Portuguese military mission's stay in China, military aircraft factories, naval shipyards and war material plants were visited, in addition to contacts made with prominent individuals of the three branches of the Armed Forces, Army, Navy and Air Force. Conceicao e Silva also said that it has practically been agreed that, next year, a delegation of senior officers of the People's Liberation Army of China will visit Portugal.

The head of the first Portuguese military mission to visit the PRC stated that there are possible fields for cooperation on the military level. He also said that broad international issues were the subject of many talks, especially Soviet expansionism, Afghanistan, Iran, Southeast Asia, Taiwan and Hong Kong.

#### Further Details

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 1-7 Aug 80 p 2

(Text) The Portuguese military mission that has been visiting the People's Republic of China for almost 2 weeks now at the invitation of the Chinese Armed Forces returns to Lisbon on 8 August.

The mission, consisting of six officers from the three service branches and headed by General Conceicao e Silva, director of the National Defense Institute, has visited several Chinese provinces and has contacted senior officers of the People's Liberation Army of China.

News coming from the New China Agency reports statements made by General Conceicao e Silva in Peking, according to which "Portugal was one of the victims of Soviet maneuvers for hegemony."

These and other statements of a political nature have not yet given rise to reactions by the Lisbon military authorities who prefer to await the return of the delegation for a more complete clarification of how and if they were made. This trip to China is the first one made to that country by the Portuguese Armed Forces as an institution.

10,042  
CSO: 3101

## BRIEFS

NEW INFANTRY HEAD NAMED--Today, Friday, Brigadier Firmino Miguel takes over the duties of director of infantry, relieving Gen Nunes Igrejas, who retires shortly. Firmino Miguel, who was minister of Defense in the first and second provisional governments and in the first, second and third constitutional governments, had been assigned, at present, to the Institute of High Military Studies. When he was contacted by O JORNAL, Firmino Miguel said that his appointment had already been scheduled for some time and that it has no significance or special plan in his new duties. Firmino Miguel, whose promotion to general is to be decided on in the meeting of the Council of the Revolution next week, also stated to O JORNAL that, in spite of the fact that the posts of directors of Army branches are usually filled by generals, it is not unusual for a brigadier to serve in that capacity. (Text) (Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 1-7 Aug 80 p 2) 10042

CSO: 3101

**PALME ATTACKS COALITION'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM**

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Aug 80 p 2

[Editorial by Svante Nylander: "Social Democratic Repeat"]

[Text] At a press conference on 29 August Olof Palme characterized the Government's measures against the economic crisis as a "panic merry-go-round." The Social Democrats were not going to let themselves be dragged onto it. Palme roughly attacked the Government's manner of deliberating with the opposition.

The main point in the Government's crisis program was a devaluation of the krona by 10 percent. The year was 1977. Yesterday, 3 years to the day later, it was a question of a crisis program of a different character, but the tone at Palme's press conference was similar.

The Social Democrats built their policy of 1977 on a denial of the cost crisis they themselves had left. Presently they deny that there is any problem of overconsumption. Both Gunnar Strang and Kjell-Olof Feldt express themselves very clearly. There is no problem of overconsumption in Swedish society. Not "in the present situation." According to the proposal of the Social Democrats, there must be distinguished a difference between a short-range and long-range perspective. The deficit in the trade balance of 20 billion kronor is evidence of an overconsumption problem only in the long-range perspective. Purchasing power is not too high in the present business situation.

The Social Democrats are making the same sort of mistake today as in 1977. They are presenting rows of suggestions and blueprints which are said to offer a long-range, viable alternative, but in reality shove the main problem aside. Their criticism against the Government is getting to sound hollow, even in those elements where they are right.

Kjell-Olof Feldt says that in practice all critics consider the tax increases wrong. That is an exaggeration, but Feldt can undeniably support this by many statements from the labor organizations and from business. Pehr Gyllenhammar [President of Volvo] suggested in yesterday's DAGENS NYHETER that the value-added tax should be lowered instead of raised.

what are the bases of the opinions held by those sharing Fieldt's views? The labor organizations are against the rise in the value-added tax out of concern for their members' real wages. The trade balance is not their affair! Representatives of business and industry are looking after their enterprise's sales, and the belt-tightening which is demanded ought, according to them, effect state expenditures, not household purchasing power. Therefore they say no to higher taxes.

The no-front against the tax package is an unholy alliance. It will dissolve just as soon as there is talk of an alternative.

The Social Democrats have adopted the older arguments of the bourgeois parties and forgotten their own. When they themselves ruled they did not hesitate to tighten the economy to manage the foreign trade balance and to hold back inflation as long as possible. When their critics answered that belt-tightening creates unemployment, they replied that full employment cannot be purchased at the price of unbalance in the entire economy. A general belt-tightening policy must instead be combined with selective measures in support of employment, and those measures must be financed. This line of reasoning the Social Democrats have now tossed overboard. In the proposal it is stated the Government, with its tax plan, surrendered "the attempt of combining an active economic policy with a policy to protect employment." The truth is the opposite. Without raising taxes the chances of taking care of employment would be worse.

When DAGENS NYHETER recently pointed out this connection ARBETET (Social Democratic) replied, with an attempt at irony:

Un hu, first the government will reduce purchasing power by measures which give the government more money. Then the government will spend this money in order to create purchasing power for those people made unemployed because the government reduced purchasing power and forced business to lay off people. It would be much simpler if people got to keep their jobs and their purchasing power from the beginning.

Many critics of the Social Democrats argued the same way before 1976. They did not want to hear of the combining of a general belt-tightening and a selective employment policy. Today the situation is reversed. The bourgeois parties applied such a combination in 1977 and 1978--which the Social Democrats now regard as wrong!

We will not shrink ourselves out of the difficulties, says Olof Palme. We must work and expand ourselves into balance. Even the Government said it would be this easy last spring. But the labor union movement did not permit Swedish business to compete on the world market with cost conditions which would have made it possible to fulfill that expansive strategy. The labor conflict and the wage agreement force us to shrink rather than to grow. From the way the agreement was arranged it was only a matter of time before the value-added tax should be raised.

The Social Democrats reject raising the value-added tax with the argument that it "undermines the wage agreement." The result of the wage movement is considered as superior, something which cannot be touched. One can change perspective and say that the year's agreement undermines the Government's economic policy. Whichever viewpoint one chooses depends on where one finally lays responsibility for the country's economy.

CSO: 3109

## MUNICIPAL COUNCIL DISCUSSES JULY RIOTS, POLICE INTERVENTION

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 15 Aug 80 p 21

[Report by "sir": "The Riots of 12 July--Proportionality of Police Action"]

[Text] Mrs Schmid (POZ [Zurich Progressive Organizations]) in an interpellation poses various questions in connection with the excesses of 12 July. How does the Municipal Council justify the utterly disproportionate and brutal police action? Were the lack of official approval of the demonstration and the existence of a flier sufficient reason for it? Was it intended to drive the youths into the street in order to be able to arrest as many as possible? What is the position of the Municipal Council concerning the charge of disturbance of the peace at the youth center? Finally, the interpellator criticizes the "civil war kind of" use of tear gas and rubber bullets, asking whether it is part of the municipal youth policy and whether this also helps educate autonomous media personnel. Can the policy of confrontation solve the pending problems, and is the Municipal Council prepared to seek new political ways and, with this in mind, also to advocate the release of those arrested, the dropping of charges and the suspension of penal proceedings with the officers concerned? What kind of steps are taken to insure an objective investigation into cases of police excesses during a police action? The interpellator accuses the Municipal Council of conducting an insincere policy.

Municipal Councilor Hans Frick replies to the interpellations, in the main, as follows:

Since 30 May 1980 several demonstrations have taken place in Zurich during which, or in the wake of which, as a rule violations of the law occurred. Accordingly, the city police made the necessary preparations for the weekend of 12/13 July 1980 to be able to fulfill the mission of the police--to maintain public peace, order and security--within the framework of the principle of proportionality. In accordance with past experience, it proved unavoidable for the protection of the police employed to order the wearing of the security police outfit. It having once more not having been deemed necessary to apply for a demonstration permit, which in fact would have been given provided certain conditions and injunctions were observed, the police, after issuing a warning, proceeded to clear Limmatstrasse of

of the demonstrators. To obtain a permit is no mere formality. The main purpose is to check necessary restrictions with a view to maintaining traffic and preserving public peace, order and security and to inform the responsible permit holder of them.

As a result, the police were covered by a hail of projectiles of all kinds-- cobblestones, beer bottles, bricks, Molotov cocktails and pieces of iron weighing up to 2 kilograms. Already at that point, therefore, there was no question of a peaceful demonstration, as the interpellator asserts. If anyone proceeded brutally and ruthlessly, it was the demonstrators. It is impossible to see with what other means and other tactics the police could have fulfilled their legal mission in this situation. Nor can and will the Municipal Council any longer permit a situation where for weeks on end, as it were, so-called representatives of Zurich youth (many of the arrested rowdies do not live in the City of Zurich, and some not even in Switzerland) causes substantial traffic breakdowns and commit innumerable violations of the law. The principle of legality and proportionality, to which the Municipal Council holds with firm conviction, have caused the Municipal Council time and again to check its attitude about proceeding against demonstrations for which no permit was issued. Thus the Municipal Council also did not order any action against the sizable demonstration, particularly referred to by the interpellator, which was headed by Parson Sieber and Socialist Party deputies. Meanwhile it remains an open question as to what kind of impression this demonstration created among wide circles of our population. Fliers calling for the use of force, such as were distributed before 12/13 July 1980, point to tough confrontations which the police must oppose in the most decisive manner--while, of course, observing the principles of legality and proportionality.

The youth center itself was not subjected to police pressure. There can be no question of breaking the peace, particularly since the police action in accordance with instructions does not provide any evidence of this. On the other hand, the police found it necessary to proceed with tear gas and rubber bullets against those who threw the already mentioned projectiles from the roof of the 18/20 Limmatstrasse premises. There was no way to avoid the residents of these premises also being affected in the process. The blame for this lies, however, not with the police but with the people who threw things from the roof. The police were obliged to arrest the violators of the law and bring charges against them. Compared with the means used by the demonstrators and rowdies, tear gas and rubber bullets may be considered appropriate. The fact that in the process gawkers and also innocent bystanders as well as some inhabitants were affected unfortunately could not be avoided in light of the need to restore public order in accordance with the legal mission. There are no milder police weapons for fighting premeditatedly violent demonstrations.

The above makes it clear which side quite consciously sought a confrontation. The Municipal Council, however, continues to be willing to solve problems that may occur within the framework of the law, even if it should also be necessary to go unconventional routes to do so. On the other hand,

being tied and obligated to the principle of separation of powers and legality, it cannot exercise any influence on pending legal procedures. In light of the fact that the demonstrators repeatedly used force, the police definitely maintained proportionality in their action on 12 July 1980. Charges for alleged police excesses are being handled by the Office of the District Attorney.

Mascetti (Labor Party) describes the reply of the Municipal Council as "downright scandalous." People were arrested who were demonstrating for a demand which has now been met--in other words, one in line with a need. There is justification for demonstrating for the release of these people. On the other hand, it is not in line with the principle of proportionality to proceed with tear gas and rubber bullets. Just how worthwhile is it still to live in this town?

Mrs Schmid (POZ) would very much like to know what the other side thinks, but there seems to be no readiness for a dialog. Numerous remarks directed to the Municipal Council have opposed this police action. Except for paralyzing whole districts of the city, nothing was accomplished. How can one defend oneself against police excesses? Scherr (POZ) thinks it is scandalous that this council simply maintains silence whenever incidents are being dealt with which have also drawn international public attention.

8790

CSO: 3103

## COMPROMISES WITH EC SEEN THREATENING ECONOMY

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 2 Aug 80 p 4

/Text/ Izmir (TURKISH NEWS AGENCY) -- Izmir economists share the view that Turkey's accession to the Common Market would be objectionable and say, "We can never be a natural child of the EC."

Following Greece's application for full EC membership, Turkey's EC membership again becomes an issue. Asked by a TURKISH NEWS AGENCY correspondent whether Turkey should join the EC, teaching members and instructors from the Aegean University Economics Faculty replied as follows:

Assistant Professor Muzaffer Demirci

"Turkey answered 'yes' to this question with the Ankara Agreement. But in this new climate in which free market rules are being put into effect for the purpose of Westernization, in my opinion, there is no room for debate as to whether Turkey should or should not join the EC. However, the best thing in the new relations would be to make an intensive effort to eliminate or at least reduce the negative effects of this membership which steadily pushes up our foreign deficit through trade diversion."

Dr Ismail Duymaz

"Tanzania President Julius Nyerere has a saying: 'If elephants wrestle on the lawn, the lawn gets messed up.' The lawn that is getting messed up as far as we are concerned is Turkish industry. Before it joins the EC, Turkey should ensure its own domestic integration."

"Turkey's joining the EC has some advantages as to political integration, but it is too early for economic integration. Turkey is a nation with deficient production. The EC, meanwhile, is looking for places to sell its production surplus. In this climate, it will be very easy for Turkey to enter an open market trend instead of a 'Common Market.' Yes, the EC is seeking markets. There is no new nation or member to buy its goods. Turkey has more urgent problems than EC membership. The market economy has not yet found a framework. Turkey is a nation where the competition mechanism is not working and monopolies are easily formed. At this stage our country has to produce more and eliminate the relative shortage factor first of all. Besides, Turkey is looking toward the Middle East and Africa. Such an approach is a lot more useful than EC membership."

Assistant Professor Hidir Ozdemir

"Turkey has not obtained from the Common Market countries the concessions which a less developed economy in fact needs in order to prepare for full membership today. Turkey's disadvantages vis-a-vis the Common Market are steadily increasing. While development of Turkey's import-export relations with Common Market nations in the near future will answer the private sector's needs for more foreign markets, foreign exchange for imports and intermediate goods, it will also draw the national economy into a maelstrom of international agreements of indescribable harm."

Dr Mehmet Civelik

"It is very hard to establish a commercial climate based on mutual respect between nations so different as the EC nations and Turkey. The reason for Turkey's insistence on joining the EC is the belief and desire that all of its problems would be solved the moment it joined. This is a mistaken dream. New problems will be added to the ones we already have by joining the EC, such that we would never be able to solve the problems we would have then.

"Every one of the EC members, including West Germany, has increasing economic problems quantitatively and qualitatively. Doubtless, these nations, like Turkey, have been unable to resolve their economic, social and political problems and, in the near term, do not want to see equal with themselves a nation with less chance of finding solutions to these problems. If it wished, Turkey, like Greece, could have been included in the community today. It could join a community where it is not wanted only in exchange for great concessions and thus only, however. These concessions might draw the nation into dangers from every aspect for the future. For this reason, Turkey's joining the EC is objectionable under the present circumstances.

8349

CSO: 4907

## COMMUNISTS TARGET TURKISH NATIONALISTS IN WEST GERMANY

Istanbul HERCUN in Turkish 23 Jul 80 pp 1, 7

[Text] In a recent report prepared by the West German Organization for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) under the Federal Ministry of the Interior it was stated that the communists were conducting systematic attacks upon nationalist Turks in that country.

The section of the report prepared by the BfV dealing with Turks touches upon the situation in Turkey and the way it is reflected in Germany and it makes comparisons among the organizations formed by Turks.

The report states that a communist workers organization named FIDEF, [Federation of West German Worker Associations] which is under the influence of the East Berlin based TKP [Turkish Communist Party] has a membership of 18,000, as contrasted with a membership last year of 9,000, whereas the ADUTDF [European Federation of Turkish Nationalist Associations] has a membership of 26,000 and 100 neighborhood associations.

The report stated that from 1 January 1979 to the present, Turks in West Germany were the cause of 25 violent incidents in which 2 persons were killed. Communist organizations sponsored 27 demonstrations and marches. By comparison, the rightwing organizations held one march in which 5,000 persons participated.

An official of a communist organization is quoted in the report as saying, "If necessary the West German government can be forced, by fomenting discontent unrest, to take measures itself. If necessary the NAP [Nationalist Action Party] can be made to appear to be instigating some ugly incident." The report stated that the agitation of the communist groups was not directed solely at Turks, Germans were also involved in quite a few demonstrations during the past year. The Germans who participated in these demonstrations were not connected solely with extreme leftist organizations, according to the report, but also quite a few organizations calling themselves "democratic" made themselves evident in the demonstrations.

The upshot of the support from the Germans was that Turkish communists, during the CDU election campaign, created incidents in Essen and Cologne when Strauss was holding meetings there. As consequence, the administrative board of the German Confederation of Trade Unions circularized all of its state affiliates telling them it wished to avoid any sort of association with FIDEF.

The communists have attempted to attribute 107 so-called offenses to Turkish nationalists, which the report states has no basis in fact, and later in the report there are the following lines which state that the communist attacks are being instigated in accordance with a definite plan:

"Most recently, at a meeting of the General Committee in Duisburg on 9-10 February 1980, FIDEF took the same decision. On quite a few occasions, investigation revealed that violent incidents had been prepared according to a plan and then ascribed to the aforementioned organizations. It was patently evident that an act could not be attributed to the few members of these organizations."

The BfV report later on included the following views regarding the Turkish [Nationalist] Federation:

"...To date there has been no evidence to confirm allegations that nationalist Turks on orders from their central organizations have been engaging in terrorism in Germany against their political rivals. On the contrary, the ADUTDF leadership continually warn their member associations to respect the laws of their host country and is urging them to refute this type of allegation. It has not been possible to uncover a single bit of evidence to show that even one act of violence has been approved or directed by the ADUTDF leadership."

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1801 4901

## CRITICISM LEVELED AT DECAYING EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 19 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by Ali Riza Alp]

[Text] Some institutions are founded with the best of intentions. Of these, some turn out to be successful while others do not...

Such institutions have also been established in Turkish national education as well, and over the years they have carried out their functions, but because of failure to adjust to changing conditions or because they proved to be unfitted to their purposes they were disbanded. Some, however, quite to the contrary, have expanded, found the capability of renewing themselves and have become a part of the university structure.

The village institutes departed from their original aims, both in terms of their administration and with respect to changing world conditions and as such were condemned to failure. Consequently they underwent structural changes and were converted to teachers' schools. Today those who wish to revive the village institutes also know that the world has begun a process of specialization. A person no longer has much chance to do both a variety of physical jobs as well as an intellectual one. The villages of the 1980's are no longer the same as those of 1938. The information disseminated in recent years through the village institutes program is several levels above the knowledge of a primary school graduate. Under these circumstances, for those who propose the revival of the village institutes, the claims regarding "a new regime" serve as a sort to cover up.

In its final stages, the fate of the village institutes appears to resemble that of another of our institutions.

The teachers' training institutes were established in the past with the very good intention of meeting the need for teachers in the country. The Gazi Egitim Institute in Ankara, first of all, and then in later years the Istanbul Egitim Institute were of immense value to our country in terms of the select teaching staffs they turned out. It is a fact that these graduates, many of whom fill the highest posts in the Ministry of National

Education today, will not be easy to replace tomorrow. At one time, the teachers' training institutes were neck and neck with the universities in value provided to the country. We believe that the decision in recent years to extend their 2-year program to 3 and the fact that a 4-year teachers' training program has been considered and planned for demonstrates just how scientific the work of those institutes has become.

However, over the years the functioning of the teachers' training institutes has fallen to an unsuccessful level and is even running contrary to their intended purpose. The institutes have made the teaching staff inadequate to their jobs. Politics has laid its hands on them. After a while the seeds that were sown sprouted and among the new green the pink to red flowers of anarchy blossomed. Because the problem was incorrectly diagnosed at that time it has become impossible to study in the teachers' training institutes today.

Especially after the policies put into practice under Necdet Ugur, the teachers' training institutes have ceased to be institutions for training teachers. Turning out high school and equivalent teachers in 40 days constitutes "an insult to the teaching profession" during an age in which even a bootblack cannot learn his trade with less than a year's training...

#### **Education and Instruction Being Adversely Affected**

There could not have been a shrewder way to destroy an institution. Consequently, the teachers' training institutes were diverted from their purpose. Or else the intention was to produce a generation brainwashed by a foreign ideology. Policies implemented during recent years with regard to teachers' training institutes have become unreconcilable with the Fundamental Law on National Education. The outmoded practices in these and their graduates are adversely affecting the quality of education and instruction. There are even those in higher positions who claim as a virtue the fact that these institutes take in those who could not get into a university...

In summary, the teachers' training institutes have now lost their function, have actually turned contrary to their purpose, have lost their esteem in the eyes of the populace, and education and instruction in them has become impetuous. The continued existence of these institutions can serve no useful purpose. Their past greatness has become dwarfed and has even been abandoned to anarchy. It is high time to lase this wound. The officials of the Ministry of National Education must take these institutions to the operating table before the infection spreads throughout our body, tomorrow, or perhaps sooner than that.

New institutions, oriented to the scientific purpose for which these others were founded, must be established.

Institutions whose function has ceased to exist are a hump on the back of the Turkish nation, a dagger in its side, at the very least a crime, an offense.

If we wish to give future generations a sense of pride in their nation, we are obliged to train them in national institutions. But institutions which have lost their sense of nationalism cannot train a nation.

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C501 4907

## 'MILLI GAZETE' BLASTS JP DECEIT

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 28 Aug 80 p 5

[Editorial by Mehmet Fahri: "The Sole Target: the NSP"]

[Text] According to Demirel, Turkey is at an ideal juncture particularly from an economic standpoint. Whatever you want, wherever you want it, and in whatever amounts: you can find it. That is, of course, if the millions of low-income have the money it takes.

But, meanwhile, 10 to 15 persons reportedly are dying everyday as the result of anarchy... They might as well die. One can regard it as a type of population planning. After all, was it not they-through the solicitation of the US and other Western countries-who made this scandal called population planning a calamity for the nation?

Those in the West have witnessed their own populations decreasing a bit more every year instead of increasing; moreover, they have been unable to effect an increase in any way. Given this course of events, the Muslim population would exceed their own after a certain period of time. They thus have chosen to back the scheme of population planning in countries where their lackies are in power, to render Muslims sterile, and thereby to prevent their increase. You realize that they certainly have not been the least bit stingy with assistance for this purpose. They have dispatched personnel trained in this field. They have sent medicines and have even sent huge sums of money to ensure that the already sufficient Turkish population does not get any larger. But despite all the Westerners' efforts, our people have not welcomed this scandal the West is trying to perpetrate under the name of population planning and have rejected the obscenity of population planning.

As it is that today the Westerner has given our people the status of animals. When they were unsuccessful in preventing population growth by various un-Islamic means, they let loose the evil called anarchy or terror upon our society and pursued population planning in this way.

With regard to this, the JP minority government watched silently; the deaths of 10 to 15 persons a day. But, in this connection, confronted with the fact of the game that occasionally some from its own ranks were targeted, the government raised its voice a little, "So many, that just cannot be!" That is all it did.

Let us stop talking about anarchy and return to our original topic: the economic condition.

Since Mr Demirel, the head of government, claims that the economic situation is most excellent and that it improves more with every day, why, I wonder, do you say you are trying to have early elections as soon as possible- or so it would seem?

Let us simply point out that the economic situation is in no way as good as Mr Demirel says. Above all else, his empty words about the economy improving with each passing day are mere soporifics for the nation, for a government that prints bad money will never be able to rectify the economy. The need to print up 28 billion lira during the week that saw the NSP submit its motion for early elections to the Speaker of the National Assembly is not a statement of economic rectification but of bankruptcy.

Come what may, if an early election is called, it will be the byproduct of this government's ploy to side step the nation during a two-month period.

We say to Mr Demirel in this regard, "This nation will see much better after the winter where your government has taken the economy." If Mr Demirel believes that the economic situation is so much better, let him then wait for normal elections. Let the winter pass and then we all shall see how just his deserts are in the June, 1981 election.

I say that Mr Demirel is trying to employ a ruse within a ruse and thereby side step the nation. Above all, if the elections remain slated for June, 1981, Demirel is afraid that his fraud will be discovered. But despite this, if there is an early election at the behest of the NSP, he will make every effort to assure himself the next four years.

Therefore, Mr Demirel has chosen as his sole target the NSP, which has exposed to our nation his insincere attitude. The reason: it was the NSP that first made public to our nation his Western Club mentality. The honorable sir, who, until now, always managed to cleverly present this mentality to our nation as a positive...

The NSP's existence makes Demirel uncomfortable. It is not the RPP that is important to him because- whatever his relations with the RPP- they can be reconciled through their Western Club mentality. But is it so with the NSP? This party instantly discloses to our nation his every ploy.

First the JP began to have sympathetic journalists from various papers attack the NSP, later believing the right time had come- it launched its own attack. Meanwhile, the JP revised its deputy reduction policy often employed over the years; it began its efforts to set up a deputy bazaar. Is not all of this a statement of the JP's bankruptcy?

If the JP is so sure of its position and if the nation loves it so much, why then does the party feel the need to lure deputies from other parties? This is not a true path but rather the one of he who treads crookedly.

Consequently, we say that if we but wait a few months we will see very clearly how bankrupt the exploitative, capitalist JP economic policy is. Actually, in our view, the economic policy that the JP put into practice was bankrupt from the start, but several months are still required before our entire nation can see this bankruptcy.

Then we will again remind the JP and its cronies of what we have written.

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## NAP INFILTRATION, ELECTORAL PULL BIND JP TO NAP

Istanbul CUNAYDIN in Turkish 22 Jul 80 p 5

[Article by Teoman Erel]

[Text] We are back at the same point: "A grand coalition or a right-wing front?"

Although the RPP's [Republican Peoples' Party] left-wing and members of NSP [National Salvation Party] may say that "one other possibility exists," practically speaking an RPP-NSP coalition seems to have lost its probability. Ecevit's meticulous avoidance of this possibility in recent years, an Erbakan's open claims on the prime-ministership during the past few days have made such an agreement unlikely.

Demirel on the other hand, is interested in the continuation of what is essentially a right-wing front government under the label of "JP [Justice Party] minority government." This indeed is a right-wing front supported reluctantly by the NSP and fiercely by the NAP [National Action Party] seeking the government's and its own continued existence.

Ecevit has drawn increasingly closer towards those who believe that a broadly based RPP-JP government is the only way of preventing the continuation of the current situation. He is repeatedly giving a green light to undertakings and efforts in this direction. In a press conference held yesterday he repeated his wish for a broadly based government of reconstruction.

Demirel and his close friends appear concerned with recent leanings among politically significant circles towards RPP-JP cooperation in the aftermath of the murders of RPP Istanbul Representative Abdurrahman Koksaloglu and of former Prime Minister Nihat Erim. JP administrators say that while cooperation between the two parties is necessary, there is no need for a new coalition. They further state that "the political parties should support their government in the passage of laws necessary to combat terrorism."

Such a call may be appropriate from a JP standpoint, given the currently prevailing political conditions. It cannot however be defended in face of the helplessness exhibited by the government, or the unchecked terrorism now reaching for the highest objectives.

There are questions to be asked Demirel who complains of the failure to pass laws, of inadequate governmental authority and of even the general amnesty of 1974.

"What new authority was necessary to effectively protect Nihat Erim against those who had sworn to avenge March 12?"

Again we wonder.

"What new law must be passed before a reversal can take place in the practice of turning a blind eye towards violent militants with NAP leanings in Corum and Yozgat?" If possible the following question also awaits clarification:

"How is it possible to employ masked right-wing militants who are the subjects of criminal investigations alongside security forces during the operation in Fatsa? Are new powers and laws necessary to recognize that such things are wrong and harmful?"

Actually, these questions are being asked within the Justice Party in slightly modified form. A JP Member of Parliament from Corum, Ahmet Cinbek, has in his latest statement provided an illustration of the unease.

"It is regretable that the events in Corum have been instigated by militants from the NAP" said Cinbek. "A hidden motive existed behind the outbreak of the incidents. The motive consisted of instilling JP and NSP members with NAP ideals."

Ministers from the Justice Party also feel uncomfortable as the result of excesses in the NAP's behavior. A budding divergence of opinion has come into being between the government and the armed forces as the result of latest developments that clearly indicate the involvement of NAP controlled militants in acts of terrorism. The Armed Forces are of the opinion

that the responsibles for armed acts of terrorism should be pursued regardless of their ideological backgrounds. The Government on the other hand is concerned with maintaining NAP support and as a result remains hesitant in its opposition to right-wing violence. Certain security forces and administrative supervisors leaning towards the JP and the NAP over estimate this hesitation and openly cooperate with right-wing militants. The governors of Corum and Yozgat are living examples of this dangerous policy. The most recent expression of concern within the Armed Forces took place in a speech in Kayseri by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kenan Evren. While Evren condemned the proponents of violence and those who could not even bring themselves to mention the name of Ataturk, he also condemned those who appear to be followers of Ataturk while pursuing other policies.

The Justice Party however finds difficult to sever its ties to the NAP. Electoral considerations as well as other necessities force Demirel to continue his cooperation with Turkes. As the NAP is well aware of this, it makes its threatening presence felt whenever it feels that it is about to be circumvented. The resignation of Canakkale Representative Ahmet Nihat Akay from the JP where he had been registered while his sympathies were with the NAP must be seen as such a development. With this resignation the NAP is presenting the JP with the following challenge:

"Should you cooperate with the RPP, I will not only withdraw my support but I will also confront you with all of the strength that I have managed to infiltrate into your ranks."

Let us conclude by reminding that Ahmet Nihat Akay who finally resigned after several times threatening Demirel with his resignation, constitutes a very small portion of NAP leanings infiltrated into the JP.

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## COLUMNIST URGES INVESTIGATION OF YOZGAT SITUATION

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 22 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Husamettin Celebi]

[Text] Following the incident at Corum and the concern with the "pinpoint operation" in Fatsa, Yozgat has also entered the lime light.

In reply to a question, Prime Minister Demirel said that a "state of occupation in Yozgat is out of the question." In reply to this the Chairman General of the RPP, Bulet Ecevit stated that "Yozgat is under Fascist occupation."

Which of the two leaders has been telling the truth? We wanted to go to Yozgat and see for ourselves. On the day following Ecevit's press conference we were confronted with the headline "This is Yozgat" in one of our newspapers. Colleagues of ours had gone there, made observations, spoken to concerned individuals and recorded on film what they had seen.

The Governor of Yozgat had stated that Yozgat stood as the "most tranquil" province of Turkey and had rejected claims of the province being in a state of occupation. The governor appeared to challenge Ecevit to come to Yozgat and see the situation for himself. The Provincial Chairman of the Justice Party [JP] said that a "state of tranquility" was indeed in existence, and that the claims to the contrary were being generated by those who begrimed the people and Province of Yozgat the presence of such tranquility. However the RPP [Republican Peoples' Party] Provincial Chairman said that "Yozgat is definitely an NAP [National Action Party] controlled liberated zone.

From these declarations we could have assumed that the general outline of the controversy in Turkey was being transposed to Yozgat and that the Provincial Chairman of the RPP was talking about a NAP occupation so as to not fall in contradiction of the leaders within his own party. Indeed it would have been likely for us to think in this manner, had we not seen on the very same page of that newspaper the photograph and the words of the individual who holds the title of Provincial Chairman of the NAP in Yozgat.

Let us begin with the photograph. It shows a young man standing in front of the highway department roadsign indicating the population and elevation of the city of Yozgat at the entrance to that city. The man wears a hat and his neck and torso are visible (through unbuttoned clothing). The pistol displayed in his right hand is slightly raised and pointed to the ground... It's as if he is not the leader of the political party who has received the largest number of votes in that province. It's as if he were an individual sought by the government as the leader of a group in revolt against central authority. He swaggers. Two days later in the same newspaper we read a clarification concerning this photograph. "During our conversation the reporter looked at my weapon and asked how I had managed to obtain it. I pulled out my weapon and said it had been issued to me by the state during the tenure of the 22 month long RPP Government." The Provincial Chairman of the NAP says these things yet fails to clear the record. This photograph in itself indicates that unusual things are happening in Yozgat. Moreover, the NAP's Provincial Chairman for Yozgat did not restrain himself and do no more than pose for the photograph.

In addition he stated that he "Had done what the state had been unable to do and formed an Intelligence Organization." He maintained that five thousand of his operatives followed every step of everyone in Yozgat while not allowing any opportunity to individuals inclined towards wrongdoing. Two days later in another statement he attempts to explain away these brazen words, however once again he is not convincing. The existence of the photograph in question does not allude to denials or refutations to sound convincing to any individual.

As things stand there is no need to relate all of the words of the provincial chairman or to go to Yozgat to analyze the situation. Anyone who has considered all the news items of the past few days alongside the photograph taken at the entrance to Yozgat can comfortably say that some unusual things are happening there. One thing is certain: The words "Yozgat the tranquil city" as pronounced by the Governor and by the Provincial Chairmen of the JF and the NAP are correct only in reference to a different kind of tranquility. The "tranquility" that is claimed for Yozgat consists merely of silence stemming from a predominant sense of fear. Were it proper to consider as tranquility the silence that is founded in fear, then it would be appropriate to consider other places where one side has expelled or silenced another, places such as Diyarbakir as tranquil regions. Yozgat and other similar places are not cities of tranquility but cities of fear. Those who have brought about such an atmosphere in certain cities can under no pretext be condoned.

Some things may be expected from Turkes, leader of the NAP. For his "Calls to peace" of the last several months to maintain any significance it is necessary for him to undertake proceedings in the case of the Provincial Chairman at Yozgat. Failure to do so will dissuade even those who feel that his calls to peace "May be well meant." Also, the government should not act as if there were no questions to be answered in the case of Yozgat.

The government may not pretend that "The force that has brought fear to the population of Yozgat is not aimed towards the overthrow of the state." In spite of the difficulties involved, the time has come to take the measures that will bring about the supremacy of the Constitution in Yozgat. Otherwise, other bullies in other places may use the existence of Yozgat as a pretext for even more extremist behavior. Measures undertaken to deal with them, will then not win approval in the conscience of the people.

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## POLITICIANS WATCH IN ON FATSA INCIDENTS

İstanbul CUMHİYET in Turkish 26 Jul 80 pp 1,5

[Text] In a joint meeting of the Grand National Assembly yesterday, discussions were held on the subject of terrorist incidents, and after a presentation by the presidium, the spokesman for the RPP [Republican People's Party], Bulent Ecevit, said that "when the informers with the black masks who were used in Fatsa turned out to be rightwing activists (the prime minister said that they had done a shameful thing) it would be appropriate to arrest the leaders who were behind this shameful act since they shared in it, and that was the reason they were wearing those black masks."

Ecevit, recalling Denizel's call during the past few days for the reestablishment of the State Security Court and for emergency powers legislation, asked, "To whom shall we grant emergency powers? To those who know the masked murderers of Fatsa?" He added, "We shall not give such powers to a government that still keeps the Ordu governor in office."

## Presidium's Presentation

On the opening of the joint session of the Grand National Assembly, a presentation was read from the presidium. In this presentation it was stated that the terrorism that was prevalent throughout the country was shaking the system to its very roots, and that "the bloodthirsty murder of Istanbul MP Abdurrahman Koksaloglu and former prime minister Nihat Erkin by those who want to destroy the country was a heavy and painful blow against our parliament and democracy through the persons of the victims."

After this presentation, the spokesman for the RPP group, Bulent Ecevit, declared that in the face of such important events the government had a duty to make an explanation and asked why the government, which bore the principal responsibility did not feel such a need.

## Right Against Left

Ecevit next made an analysis of terrorism which has been 15 years in preparation and has now reached its present dimensions. Ecevit called to mind

the fact that 15 years ago those who were then in office encouraged some persons to arm themselves against the power of the state. Later, Ecevit said, weapons training took place in a number of camps known to the government and this was pointed out in a report prepared by the then JP (Justice Party) minister of the interior. In that period, gasoline was poured on the sparks which had been ignited by leftwing activist groups, Ecevit said, and rightwing activists were trotted out against a handful of leftwing activists. Ecevit stated that in the words of Interior Minister Gulcugil, who resigned, it was clear that there were partisans of this policy within the JP itself.

Ecevit read passages from Gulcugil's press statement (I was violently opposed to the view expressed within the JP that when terrorist incidents began, rightwing activists should be brought out to counter leftwing activists). "This means," said Ecevit, "that there were ardent supporters of this view within the JP of that period. The fact that no action against these paramilitary camps was taken at the time is clear evidence of this. Later on, in the front government period, collaboration between the JP and forces based on violence was worked out," Ecevit said.

#### Curses

The RPP chairman general went on to recall that Demirel had sent flowers to the congress of organizations which were participating in acts of violence, and at this point the JP group sprang to its feet and started shouting, while the RPP group applauded Ecevit. Later on, Ecevit recounted that rightwing terrorists had lodged themselves in the state administration and read passages from an interview Abdi Ipekci held with Demirel to show that the prime minister took sides in this matter. All this time the JP members were shouting and calling out and curses were being exchanged between the RPP and JP members. Ecevit stated that after Gulcugil had expressed his opinion that rightwing terrorists were also harmful to the state he was forced to resign from office. He recalled that when the informers who were wearing black masks in the Fatsa incident turned out to be rightwing activists, the prime minister considered it sufficient to say "they were disgraceful." Ecevit continued as follows:

#### Government's Black Masks

"By keeping the officials who used those individuals with the black masks in their jobs, the government is wearing the same black masks themselves. When the Ankara martial law authorities said that security could not be assured with Renat Akkaya this person was sent to Ordu as governor. The prime minister said the other day, 'What is the matter in Yozgat?' He does not explain why forces other than the government have taken over there. It is not yet clear why the minister of interior has been relieved of his job. Was it because he made some blunder which led to the interpellation? Or was it because, as the most authoritative voice, he said that certain forces the government had supported had turned out to be damaging to the state. It will not do any good to remove the minister from office. What is needed is to change this attitude. Can it be that

Demirel is going to say the same thing about Yozgat that he said about Fatsa? Can it be that he is going to remove from office those officials who used the masked informers? Communism is a pretext. The real target is the RPP. As the prime minister pronounced on the television screens, 'the RPP is the real mischiefmaker in Turkey.' When the prime minister talks like that, it cannot be considered surprising that the terrorists take the RPP as a target."

#### Plan Directed At RPP

Ecevit noted that the RPP was a democratic force which closed the doors which had been opened to communism and constituted an obstacle to fascism and exploitation, so consequently all sorts of methods had to be resorted to to remove the RPP from the scene, and he went on to say:

"Up to now there has never been any discrimination in the RPP between Sunni and Alevi. But now the plan is to identify the Alevi's (Alawite, Shi'ite) with the left and the Sunni's with the right, and in this way to break the Sunni's away from the RPP. They are trying to alienate the Alevi's from the RPP as well by saying that 'the RPP cannot defend your rights.' This plan is being carried out in other ways as well. Rightwing terrorists are attacking districts where RPP supporters are living. Government forces are protecting these terrorists. Leftwing militants in the same districts are accusing the RPP of pacifism. Meanwhile the neighborhood youths are arming themselves for defense and then after a while they begin to see weapons strengthening fascism, on the one hand, are at the same time strengthening its antithesis, communism, with their own hands."

#### Answer To Demirel's Proposals

Later on the RPP leader, recalling Demirel's call for the DGM (State Security Court) and for the declaration of a state of emergency, said, "A while ago a packet of emergency measures was voted by the parliament, and what happened? Terrorism quadrupled. Let us increase authority 10 times over. What will happen? The shah of Iran had more than that. Was it enough to keep him on his throne?"

The RPP leader, recalling that the government had been formed without the support of the RPP and that it depended upon a total of 230 votes to stay in office, asked, "All of these laws are on the parliament's agenda, why does the government not get them passed? Why has parliament been holding them up for 4 1/2 months?"

Ecevit concluded as follows:

"We have objections to the DGM and the state-of-emergency laws. We are not going to give this government, which is keeping the Ordu governor in office, the power to appoint judges. And are we to recognize emergency laws for those who acknowledge the masked murderers in Fatsa? We say: Let us cooperate (boos from the JP group). Turkey is in a situation worse than war,

a situation in which it is not certain who is the enemy. If we do not cooperate to save the state today, when will we ever cooperate? (sounds of 'May God damn them' from the JP rows). For the sake of our police officers and soldiers who are falling victim every day, for the sake of citizens who have been tortured to death, let us cooperate. Let us surrender the state to nonstate forces."

#### Contingent Group

Later on, the spokesman for the contingent group, Fahri Coker, took the floor and maintained that while the presidential election is on the parliamentary agenda, national problems are not getting the required amount of attention. Coker said, "Anarchism and terrorism are problems which rise above party concerns and we must address them together in unity. Therefore, we urge our political parties to adopt a common attitude and when called for accept a common responsibility."

#### The JP's Karaca

Erzurum Deputy Giyasettin Karaca, who presented the views of the JP group, said that he was going to address himself above all to the realities in the country, "without playing politics," and added that "in our opinion, in order to head off anarchy and arrest the murderers, intervention must occur before the incident not afterward." Karaca continued in the following vein:

"The greatest danger facing Turkey is communism. Unfortunately this is the reality. The reality lying behind the cries of fascism is this. As is known, the late Nihat Erim was the prime minister following the 12 March memorandum (which Ecevit says was directed against him). Again, as is known, the 1961 constitution was amended in a number of its important provisions during that period. Anarchists who were sentenced to imprisonment during this period were released in 1974 under the general amnesty. After this the anarchist movements increased in tempo."

#### Advice of National Security Council

Karaca dealt with the 1971-73 period and said that some of the ideas and acts which the political parties persist in do not square with realities in this country and must be abandoned at least for a period. He continued his talk as follows:

"No matter what our political ideas may be, we must unite. Italy did this. After the murder of Aldo Moro all small issues were put aside. There was a whole hearted mobilization from the leftwing to the rightwing. A huge country cried out 'enough!' The National Security Council, in view of the extent to which anarchy has developed in Turkey, has recommended that the country be spared further terrorism and anarchy by the speedy enactment of the laws on the DCM, the state of emergency and by strengthening the martial law command." Karaca said, "These laws are not against workers.

civil servants, students and teachers, they must be used against anarchists and terrorists who have been documented as traitors to the country."

The JP spokesman said in the final section of his talk that the political debate had caused anarchy to mount and the "the so-called leaders should stop their exploitation of death and their ugly accusations."

#### JP and RPP Were not Successful

The senator from Siirt, Idris Arikan, who presented the views of the NSP [National Salvation Party], said that the RPP and the JP had been unsuccessful in preventing incidents by violence and that "violence cannot be prevented by abridging democratic rights. This can only lead to filling the jails. These measures will bring the government to a more compromising stance, but they cannot achieve any results."

Arikan asserted that until Turkey has been rescued from Western cultural imperialism, it cannot be rescued from anarchy, and said that the partisan leadership of the government and the attitudes of the parties toward each other had created an antireligious atmosphere.

The NSP spokesman recalled that his party had submitted a 12-point package of proposals for the prevention of anarchy but that the government had no intention of giving heed to them. He demanded the formation of a "national solution" government to preside until 19 August and early elections after that date if this should also prove not to be successful.

#### The NAP [Nationalist Action Party] Group

Agah Oktay Guner, who spoke for the NAP group, said that his party had not lost its resolve with the murder of Gun Sazak, and added that those who wished to wreak civil strife and disputes in the country had slaughtered more than 40 of their people. He said, "There is no left-right warfare in Turkey. The traitors who want to destroy the state are being directed from a single center. May God curse the one's who are manufacturing the so-called Turk-Kurd, Alevi-Sunni, East-West divisions in this country. What they really want is for all of us to spill out into the streets and cut each other's throats."

Later on, Guner referred to a book by Canadian writer Sarah Levinson which has been printed in Turkey by the Hurriyet Press and which makes some assertions regarding Ecevit's attendance at anticomunist seminars at Harvard University which were arranged by the CIA and given by Kissinger. At this RPP MP Tuzun interjected, "You are calling Ecevit both communist and anticomunist."

#### MBG Did Not Speak

The MBG [National Unity Group] declined to speak at the joint session because, as it stated in a memorandum, "It would not do any good."

One member of the MBG, in explaining the stand of this group on this issue said, "We have nothing to say. There is nothing to be gained by 'flailing the water' in the atmosphere of this general meeting. Therefore, as a group we see no use in speaking."

The same MP added that the joint session on the subject of anarchism was not in conformance with the internal rules of parliament.

#### Demirel's Words

Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, speaking for the government said, "No one can spare his conscience in the face of this bloodletting. Grave incidents are continuing."

Demirel explained that one must consider the success of martial law and the existence of the state as equated with one another, and said, "It is hard to separate the armed forces from martial law, but if we are unable to eliminate the conditions which have led to martial law, it is of no use to try. This struggle which the Turkish armed forces have undertaken must be successful, and we are obliged to make it so."

"We shall tell you what must be done for the sake of the country. Come, let us together gain authority for the Turkish Republic. I am saying, 'Let us gain this authority for its current government.' I do not want these powers for myself as leader of the Justice Party. They are not necessary for me. Neither does the JP group need them. These powers are not needed by my ministers either. These powers are needed for the struggle against anarchy, for drying up this sea of blood, acting within the law. Are you figuring as if you will never come to power yourselves? One day we shall go and you shall come to office, or else someone else will."

Demirel, who asserted that the talks at the general meeting had not produced any solutions, asked, "Who said what and what did it resolve?" And he continued as follows: "A government which you put together has to be the instrument to end this blood bath. Come on now, let us figure out how to put an end to it. Let us deliberate here. Later on let us go to a restaurant and have a meal and then come back and deliberate some more. This is not the unity, the togetherness we had in mind. The state has come to a position where it cannot administer any punishment. Come on, let us approach these laws. Let us put Article 136 of the constitution to work. Let us turn things over to the civilian government under the umbrella of the military instead of loading everything on the backs of the military every time we get into trouble."

Demirel said that the armed forces units assigned to duty in the martial law command had been working in a very unselfish manner, announcing that in Istanbul 12,000 soldiers and noncommissioned officers, 700 officers and 14 generals had been assigned to this duty. In addition to these, he said, there are 8,000 police ready at all times. Demirel continued as

follows: "You said, 'If we come to power anarchy will come to an end.' It did not. We came to office and the incidents continued. You say, 'It will stop if the JP and RPP form a government together.' They will not stop then either. We are saying, let us pass this legislation. Let us give more authority to the state. Turkey needs these laws today. The political parties must come together for this. They must be passed as soon as possible. We are showing you a positive course of action, but you are saying no, it should not be done. In that case, we say let us go to elections in 60 days. Think about it, make a move. I am closing the door."

Feyzioglu took the floor after Demirel and speaking for himself said that the parties had not united around the presentation of the presidium and instead had been accusing each other. He reminded everyone that the president had not yet been elected. At this point, the MP from Zonguldak, Avni Gursoy, who is a member of the RPP Central Committee began to badger him, saying, "You want to be elected yourself." This resulted in a heated exchange between the two, and after Feyzioglu had sat down Gursoy went over to him and continued to shout at him and said "Come outside and let us discuss it." Other RPP members intervened in the dispute at this point and put an end to it. In the meantime, a pushing and shoving match had erupted in the row ahead of Feyzioglu. During this disturbance the RPP Trabzon deputy, Ahmet Sener, who was on the sidelines, noticed that Turkes's bodyguards, which had been outside, had entered the room and were mixing in the fray. He scolded the police on duty at the doors and told them that no bodyguards other than themselves should be admitted to the room, and brought this to the attention of the administrative official, Mustafa Kemal Cilesiz.

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